


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GO WORLD

SUMMER 1996 NO. 77



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Cover: An oban print by Utamaro. One of six famous beauties, depicting her as having just finished her bath, shaved her eyebrows, and with her hair is still tied back.

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Go World News

News from Japan

Cho Chikun Defends the Honinbo Title Sets a New Record

Takagawa's record of holding the Honinbo title for nine terms has finally been broken by Cho Chikun. By defeating the challenger, Ryu Shikun, 4-2, Cho has set a new record of holding the Honinbo title for ten terms. Of course, Takagawa's record was set by holding this title for nine consecutive terms, but Cho is right behind him. If he defends it again next year, he will tie Takagawa's record.

Cho took an early lead in the match, easily winning the first two games, but in the third game a group of Cho's stones got into trouble in the early middle game and their loss was too great for Cho to overcome, so he resigned after 178 moves. But Cho's fourth game was a masterpiece and, with three games left to play, Cho needed only one more win to retain his title for the 8th consecutive term. However, Ryu fought back with the white stones and took the fifth game by 2 1/2 points.

In the sixth game, played on July 16 and 17, Ryu Shikun, playing Black, proceeded to build a large territorial framework, but Cho

again proved to be an expert at dealing with these frameworks and won the game by 4 1/2 points and with it the title match.

On page 31, we feature a special commentary by Rin Kaiho on the first game and, on page 37, a commentary by Otake on the second game. The remaining games will be presented in the next issue.

Yoda Captures the 21st Gosei Title

Yoda Norimoto, the current Judan title holder, has won another title. Less than two months after defending his Judan title against O Rissei, he defeated Cho Chikun on June 6 in the final game of the Gosei tournament to earn the right to challenge Kobayashi Satoru for the 21st Gosei title in a best-of-five match.

Yoda won the series by a lopsided score of three straight wins. In the first two games, played on July 11th and 20th, Yoda forced Kobayashi to resign, but the third game, played on July 30th, was a cliffhanger: Yoda barely managed to win by half a point.

After a magnificent performance in 1995, when he took both the Kisei and Gosei titles, the first half of 1996 has been a disaster for Kobayashi, with both his hard-earned titles being wrested from his grasp.



*The new Gosei, Yoda Norimoto, going over the last
game with the vanquished champion, Kobayashi Satoru*

Cho Chikun to Challenge Takemiya for the Meijin Title

The final round of the 21st Meijin league was held on August 1. Cho Chikun, who had been leading throughout most of the league with only one loss, won his last game against Rin Kaiho by 3 1/2 points to finish with a score of seven wins to one loss.

In spite of Cho's dominance in the league this year, it was not certain that he would become the challenger. If he had faltered and lost to Rin, he might not have even gotten into the playoff to decide the challenger. There were three other players with two losses, and if O Rissei and Kobayashi Koichi (both were ranked higher than Cho) had won their last games, the playoff would have been between them. As it turned out, Kobayashi lost to O Meien but O Rissei beat Kataoka Satoshi, so if Cho had lost, he would have had to play O Rissei in a playoff.

If last year was the year when the younger generation of go players started winning major titles, this year has certainly been the year of Cho Chikun. He started off the year by taking back the Kisei title, which he lost to Kobayashi Satoru, then defended his Honinbo title against Ryu Shikun, and now he is the challenger for the Meijin title. If he wins the upcoming title match with Takemiya, he will again hold the top three title Japanese titles. As the challenger for a best-of-seven ti-

tle, Cho has never lost in a title match, so, from Takemiya's point of view, he is the most dangerous of all possible opponents.

In 1983, Cho held the Kisei, Meijin, and Honinbo titles simultaneously, the only player to have ever accomplished this feat. However, in 1986 he went into a slump. A week before he was to defend his Kisei title in January, 1986, he had a near-fatal accident in which he was hit by a car. In spite of his serious injuries, he played the title match, but lost 4-2 to Kobayashi Koichi. Although he won the Gosei title against Otake that year, it wasn't until 1988, when he won the Judan title, and 1989, when he retook the Honinbo title, that he started to regain his old form. But the road to being a challenger for a top three title is a long and arduous one, even for a player of Cho's caliber, and he was never able to dominate the Japanese tournament scene as he did in the early 1980's. But now the era of Cho has returned and he is clearly in top form.

Whatever the result of this upcoming title match, go fans throughout the world can expect some exciting games from these two champions. Their styles are diametrically opposed: Takemiya is the master at winning with large-scale moyos, whereas Cho, who goes for territory in the opening, is a master at invading these moyos.

The first game of the title match will be held September 6-7 in Hong Kong.

The 21st Meijin League (final result). Title Holder: Takemiya Masaki

Rank		KK	OR	CC	KM	KS	RK	YN	KN	OM	Won	Lost
1	Kobayashi Koichi		○	○	●	○	●	○	○	●	5	3
2	O Rissei	●		●	○	○	○	○	○	○	6	2
3	Cho Chikun	●	○		○	○	○	○	○	○	7	1
4	Kato Masao	○	●	●		○	○	○	○	○	6	2
5	Kataoka Satoshi	●	●	●	●		○	○	○	○	4	4
6	Rin Kaiho	○	●	●	●	●		○	●	○	5	3
7	Yoda Norimoto	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	●	0	8
7	Kudo Norio	●	●	●	●	●	○	○		●	2	6
7	O Meien	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	○		3	5



Lee Chang-ho (left), on his way to victory over the Kobayashi Koichi in the 9th Fujitsu Cup.

International Tournaments

Lee Chang-ho Leads in the Japan-China-Korea Meijin Tournament

The first round of the China-Korea-Japan Tournament has been completed and Lee Chang-ho has beaten both Ma Xiaochun and Takemiya Masaki. As we reported in *Go World* 76, Lee beat Takemiya in the first game of this series on April 10, but on May 13 Takemiya went off to Beijing and, playing white, eked out a half-point win against Ma.

The following month, on June 3, the third game was played between Lee and Ma, again in Beijing. Lee won this game, playing White, by 2 1/2 points, taking a clear lead in this series with two straight wins.

Poor Ma is taking a beating in this tournament. On July 10, it was his turn to come to Tokyo and play Takemiya again. This time, it seemed as if Ma, playing White, had a won game, but he made a mistake on move 156 and Takemiya was able to stage an upset, forcing Ma to resign after 263 moves.

Lee Wins the 9th Fujitsu Cup

With three of their players getting into the quarterfinals of this year's Fujitsu Cup, it seemed as if the Japanese were poised to take back this international tournament which

they had dominated in its first few years. But it was not to be. When the quarterfinals were held in Beijing on May 31, the only Japanese player to survive was Kobayashi Koichi, who beat the hero of the 10th Japan-China Super Go Series, Chang Hao (see GW76, page 60). The legendary Fujisawa Shuko fell to Liu Xiaoguang of China and the Chinese champion Ma Xiaochun beat Kobayashi Satoru, the former Japanese Kisei. Finally, the 20-year-old Korean go prodigy, Lee Chang-ho, beat O Meien, originally from Taiwan, but who now makes his career in Japan.

In the semifinals, played on July 6, Kobayashi, Japan's last hope, went down to defeat at the hands of Lee, while Ma beat his compatriot Liu.

The final was held on August 3 and, for the second time this year, Lee and Ma faced each other in a major international title. (Last March, Lee beat Ma 3-1 in the Tong Yang Securities Cup final.) Again Lee triumphed. Playing Black, he took a lead in the opening and held on to it until Ma finally resigned after Black 165. Having prevailed against the world's top players, at the tender age of 21 (his birthday was July 29), Lee Chang-ho is the undisputed go champion of the world.

In the game played to decide 3rd and 4th place, Kobayashi Koichi beat Liu Xiaoguang.

The 11th China-Japan Super Go

Hane Naoki 6-dan, son of the Hane Yasumasa who beat Nie Weiping in Japan's first Super Go triumph more than seven years ago, defeated China's Wang Lei 6-dan by 5 1/2 points in the third game of this series, played on July 18 in Dalian, China. It was a seesaw battle. Hane, playing white, took the lead around move 40, lost it after move 50, regained it after move 80, and held on from there to the end.

However, Hane didn't fare as well in the next game, played two days later on July 20, when he faced last year's Super-Go hero Chang Hao 7-dan. Chang, playing white, went for outside influence in the opening and recovered from a territorial deficit to win by 2 1/2 points. Chang will face Yoda Norimoto in the fifth round, to be played in Japan in the near future.

Besides Yoda, the remaining members of the Japanese team are O Rissei, Ryu Shikun, Kobayashi Satoru, and Otake Hideo.

On the Chinese side, four players are left after Chang. They are Liu Xiaoguang, Zhang Wendong, Cao Dayuan, and Ma Xiaochun.

The First LG Cup World Baduk Championship

A new international go tournament has been inaugurated by a Korean corporation known as the LG Group. The winner of this tournament will receive 200,000,000 won (about \$250,000), making it the most lucrative of the international tournaments after the Ing Cup. The tournament started out with 31 players, eight from Japan, 14 from Korea, six from mainland China, two from Taiwan, and one from the United States. All the Japanese title holders were present, as well as Kobayashi Koichi and Yuki Satoshi, but after two rounds had been played only Kobayashi Satoru remained in the best eight. Among the big names that got knocked out in the first two rounds, held on June 25 and 27, were Nie Weiping, Kobayashi Koichi, Takemiya Masaki, Cho Chikun, Ryu Shikun, O Rissei, and Yoda Norimoto.

In the quarterfinals, to be held later this summer, Lee Chang-ho will play Kobayashi Satoru and Yoo Chang-hyuk, the young Korean player who is second only to Lee Chang-

ho, will play Jiang Zhujiu (who is representing the United States). Two other famous players who are also in the quarterfinals are Korea's Cho Hun-hyun and Ma Xiaochun, China's strongest player.

The 3rd Ing Cup

The 3rd Ing Cup, sponsored by the Ing Chang-Ki Goe Foundation of Taiwan, is now under way. The first three rounds were held on April 24, 26, and 28. Players from the Nihon Ki-in did very well in this tournament for a change, with three, Cho Chikun, Rin Kaiho, and Yoda Norimoto, making it into the semifinals. The only non-Japanese still playing is Yoo Chang-hyuk of Korea.

The semifinals, which are two best-of-three matches, will be held in the fall. Yoda is scheduled to play Cho and Rin will play Yoo. The final will be a best-of-five match.

Although Yoo, the 1993 Fujitsu Cup champion, is outnumbered by the Japanese, he will be no pushover. On his way to the semifinals in this tournament he beat O Rissei, Otake Hideo, and his compatriot Lee Chang-ho in the quarterfinals.

Lee and Yoo Promoted to 9-dan

In recognition of the fact that Lee Chang-ho and Yoo Chang-hyuk are the two top players in Korea and because of their brilliant results in international tournaments, the Korean Baduk Association has promoted them to the rank of 9-dan. Previously, Lee was ranked 7-dan and Yoo 6-dan. The many 9-dan players who have fallen and will fall to these two previously underrated players should appreciate this long-overdue promotion.

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of the Japanese and
international go scene, log in
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Kobayashi Reiko 6-dan (1939–96)



The go world was shocked by the news of the sudden death at the age of 56 of Kobayashi Reiko on 16 March 1996. Apart from her immediate family, no one had even known she was ill, but a couple of years ago she contracted breast cancer. That subsequently metastasized to the lung cancer that was the direct cause of her death.

As the daughter of Kitani Minoru and the wife of Kobayashi Koichi, Reiko would have played a prominent role in the go world anyway, but in her own right she was the one of the most successful women players, winning ten titles (a tie for first place with Sugiuchi Kazuko 8-dan). Her period of greatest success came in the decade from 1963, when she won the Women's Championship six times. Reiko also posted what still stands as the best result by a woman in a Japanese tournament open to male and female players: 8th place in the 8th Best Ten tournament, when she caused a stir by defeating Honorary Honinbo Takagawa Shukaku.

Kobayashi Reiko's life was marked by her passionate devotion to go, both in pursuing her own career and in supporting those of her father and then of her husband. After her marriage to Kobayashi Koichi, she made

it her main aim in life to create a home environment that would enable him to fulfil his potential by reaching the top in the go world. In the decade in which he virtually monopolized the Kisei and Meijin titles, Koichi always cited her domestic support as the key factor in his success.

Reiko also made a big contribution to amateur go, through her role in running the Kitani Society (*Kitani Kai*) and its successor organizations, in which the Kitani disciples taught amateur players. She spoke English well and always had a warm welcome for overseas players. Many Westerners will have fond memories of the Kitani dojo at Yotsuya, where they were able to mix with the future stars of Japanese go. As the only one of Kitani's seven children to become a go professional (he had hoped they all would), Reiko was one of the mainstays of the dojo.

The Kitani legacy continues to live on, in the shape of Reiko's daughter, Izumi 1-dan, who not only resembles her mother at her age but whose results promise similar success in the future.

Below we present Reiko's win against Takagawa, which is one of the most memorable games of her career. The commentary is taken from Volume 47 (covering six women players and published in 1983) of the Kodansha series on modern go players.

Kobayashi Reiko's titles

(as *Kitani Reiko*)

1. 11th Women's Ch'ship (1963) (defeated Ito Tomoe 5-dan 2–1).
2. 13th WC (1966) (d. Ito 2–0).
3. 14th WC (1967) (d. Ito 2–1).
4. 15th WC (1968) (d. Kodama Sachiko 1-dan 2–1).
5. 17th WC (1971) (d. Honda Sachiko 4-dan 2–0).
6. 18th WC (1972) (d. Honda 2–1).

7. 1st Women's Meijin (1973)

(as *Kobayashi Reiko*)

8. 2nd Women's Meijin (1975)
9. 3rd Women's Kakusei (1981)
10. 4th Women's Kakusei (1982)

Kobayashi Reiko v. Takagawa 8th Pro Best Ten, Round 2

White: Takagawa Shukaku, Hon. Honinbo

Black: Kitani Reiko 6-dan

Komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

Played on 28 January 1971 at the Nihon Ki-in (Takanawa).




Figure 1 (1-17)

Figure 1 (1-17)

Black 7. Reiko consistently played for thickness and centre influence when she was young. Her philosophy was, 'Go is a fighting art'.

Black 17 may look strange, but this was the Reiko style. Takagawa praised it after the game.

Figure 2 (18-38)

The shoulder hit loses all its forcefulness because of Black 19. Up to 36, White builds solid territory at the top and in the corner; Black's only compensation is her meagre *moyo*. Moreover, White gets sente to switch to 38. Kobayashi Koichi commented (quoted in the 1983 book) that instead of 19, Black had to play strongly with 2 in *Dia. 1*. White 3 to 7 would probably follow, letting Black build a strong *moyo*.

Figure 3 (39-73)

Black attacks strongly with 39 on. Instead of 42, White could bend before the attack with 'a', Black 53, White 54.

Black 53 permits White to make good shape with 54, but Black 'a' instead would have no effect on the two white stones in the bottom right corner. Black has not caught up.

Black plays 59 on to make 65 absolute sente.





Figure 2 (18-38)



Dia. 1




Figure 3 (39-73)

52: connects

White 66. If at 'b', Black strikes at 'c'; after White 'a', Black 'd', White 'e', Black plays at 66 and captures five white stones (46 to 64) in sente.

White 72. Taking the vital point with White 73 would be safer. White 72 is not quite an overplay, but it does give Black a target to attack.




Figure 4 (74-116)

Figure 4 (74-116)

Black is staking everything on her attack on the centre group, but White's *tenuki* with 86 shows that he doesn't think things are serious yet. In retrospect, there would have been no problems if White had used 82 or 84 to jump out at 89.

When Black plays 87 and 89, she is attacking in earnest.

White 94 surprised Reiko. She had expected White to press at 100: the difference of one line is crucial. After Black 95, White 98, Black 99, White has the clever move of 'a'; if Black extends at 101, White jumps to 'b' and can't be caught. Reiko was trying to resign herself to failure when Takagawa played 94.

Figure 5 (117-191)

Black 17 becomes the decisive move. Black gains a lot from the ensuing ko fight, eliminating her bad aji on the top right with 31, then playing an extra move at 33.

White makes sure of life for his centre

group with 40, but Black 43 secures the lead.

Even after Reiko's win in the first round of this tournament (by half a point against Iwata Tatsuaki 9-dan, a Kitani disciple), no one expected her to prevail against Takagawa. As Reiko commented herself, during this period of her career, she was able to play above her strength.

White resigns after Black 191.

(Translated by John Power)




Figure 5 (117-191)

27: ko; 30: ko



Visiting her father in hospital:
Minoru, Miharu (her mother), Reiko

The 20th Kisei Title Match

Cho Wins Back the Title

It takes time to become modest

Kawakuma Hiroyuki: Congratulations on winning the Kisei title again. Now that you have had two best-of-seven title matches with Kobayashi Satoru, what is your assessment of his go?

Cho Chikun: This may sound like I'm just being polite, but without any doubt Satoru is strong. It is not that he became strong, but he has been strong all along. Do you understand what I am saying?

K: You mean he was already strong last year when he took the title from you?

C: That's right. But when he became the challenger last year, I was arrogant. I didn't think he was really strong enough to challenge me. It took me a long time to become modest.

K: So it took losing the Kisei title for you to realize his strength.

C: During last year's title match, I never thought that it would be possible for me to

lose. Every time I lost a game, I became very upset. Yet I couldn't face reality. With this mentality, I was unable to win won games. Because I totally lacked modesty, I couldn't even compete against Satoru.

K: This is strong self-criticism.

C: Actually, I was always aware of his power. I was often stunned by his moves and his ability to design a strategy for each game. But there was always something in my mind that wouldn't let me admit that he was strong.

K: Well, would you say that this time you faced him with modesty and without an overly aggressive attitude?

C: I was beaten so badly last year that no one could dispute the fact that Satoru was strong enough to hold the top title in the Japanese go world, so I thought it quite possible that he would beat me again and I refrained from being overly aggressive.

K: Satoru is a bit younger than you.

C: Yes. That might have also caused me to underestimate him. But this year it didn't




Number one again. Cho and Kobayashi go over the final game in front of the TV crew.

matter. I forced myself to meet his power with power of my own, just as when I fought some of the older title holders in the past.

I'm beginning to understand go!

K: I will ask you to explain the seventh game later on, but first I would like to briefly go over this series with you. First of all, your resignation in the first game after only 85 moves created quite a stir.

C: Oh, that game. Well, what can I say? I resigned because Satoru's brilliant moves throughout the game dampened my fighting spirit; I simply gave up. In the beginning, the outcome of the ko fight in the upper left corner appeared advantageous for me. In spite of this result, as the game continued, I could feel each of his moves radiating thickness and power, and I came unglued. Then these powerful thick moves led to Black 53 and 61. Maybe I shouldn't say this, but I was fascinated by his moves.



Game 1


K: I heard that you did not expect Black to play 85. Is that correct?

C: Yes, it is. I thought Black A would be the move. I was going to respond at B. Even though the position was clearly unfavorable for me, I thought I could still continue the game, but when I saw Black 85, I decided to resign. As I already said, all of his moves fascinated me and, when I saw this last unexpected brilliancy, I lost my fighting spirit. If I

had had the same mentality as last year, I would have become deeply depressed and would not have been able to recover. But this time it didn't happen.

K: And you went on to win three games in a row.

C: Yes, but their quality was not at all impressive. Especially the third game. Satoru clearly outplayed me until the middle game. In the figure, instead of Black 1, he could have played at 20 and maintained his lead without creating complications. But the combination of 1, 3, and 5 was excellent. His only problem was missing the right time to play the hane at A, which I countered with White B. Without this mistake, the game could have been Satoru's masterpiece.



Game 3

K: Black 21 was also praised as a thick move.

C: As a result of studying Satoru's strong points, I have discovered the secret of how to win.

K: Really? How?

C: Well, that's classified information. But since I won the Kisei title back, I might as well reveal it. If you have territory and thickness, then you win. The sequence from Black 1 here is a perfect example of that.

K: Exactly what do you mean?

C: I'll be more specific. When you attack a group, you will win by either killing it or not killing it. Likewise, when you have a weak group, you win by either saving or not saving

it. To win by either means is ideal. I am telling you the truth (laughs). I thought this was a great discovery. Then I lost two games in a row (laughs).

K: The momentum to win the title decelerated.

C: Right, but unlike last year, I was not shocked by those lost games. I didn't push myself too hard to end this series in the fifth and sixth games, either.

K: Well, then, before we look at the fifth and sixth games, would you comment on the seventh game.

Game Seven

Winning a Lost Game

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Kobayashi Satoru Kisei

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each.

Played in Yokohama on March 27–28, 1996.

Commentary by Cho Chikun as reported by Kawakuma Hiroyuki.

Figure 1 (1–27). One move integrates the rest.

We had to do *nigiri* again, and Satoru got the black stones. He plays skillfully with black, so I had wanted to get black. But those are the breaks.





Figure 1 (1–27)

Black 5 and 7 show how enthusiastic he was. After the exchange of Black 7 for White

8, he made a *sanren-sei*. After playing 7, I didn't expect him to play elsewhere. But I didn't feel that it was disadvantageous for White. This exchange doesn't automatically benefit Black. It all depends on how he uses it. Anyway, the key point in this fuseki is whether Black 7 becomes good or bad.



Dia. 1


In response to White 10, I didn't expect Black 11, either. I thought he would choose the normal course as in *Dia. 1*. In that case, I would take the corner, get sente, then turn to White 8, punishing Black for neglecting his stone at 5 in *Figure 1*. In fact, I felt sort of grateful for Black 11 and carelessly slid to 12, which was a mistake.

Black 13 appeared to be approaching White 4 from the wrong side, but 15 never occurred to me. If it had, I would have played 12 at A.

Even though I was thankful for Black 7, 9, and 11, when Black jumped to 27, all of his stones became integrated. Black had already scored points.

Instead of 23, Black usually captures White 20 with Black B in a ladder. In response, I planned to pincer at C to break the ladder. Black would have no choice but to capture at D. In the game, however, Black played only one move with 23, then turned to 27.

Maybe I should have played at 1 in *Dia. 2* instead of White 26. It is painful when Black forces White to answer 4 with 5, but White would have been patient. The sequence up to White 9 might follow. If Black 6 at 'a', White hanes at 6 — this would be ideal for White.



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (28–40). Everything stems from my misreading.

White has been bested in this fuseki, but I tried to clear my mind and go on to the next stage. But again I misread the position and added insult to injury. My mistake was White 32. I'll give you the conclusion first.





Figure 2 (28–40)


I should have slid to A: that was the only move. At the top, White must not allow Black to take both B and C, so this means that Black B is always sente. This kind of situation often fetters White's future movements. That is why White should play at A. Then White can aim at separating the black stones at the top and attacking them.

When I played 32, I had the misconception that cutting at 40 would be very good for White because the ordinary joseki ends up with White 40 at D. So the result in the game appeared to end up clearly in White's favor, and I didn't think Satoru would play Black 33 and settle for such a disadvantageous result. I placed too much value on White 40.

I expected Black to wedge in at 1 in *Dia. 3*. White 2 and 4 are out of the question, as the ladder is favorable for White.




Dia. 3



Dia. 4

What about White 2 in *Dia. 4*?

Black has a good move at 5, which is annoying to White. If White retreats to 6, Black extends to 7 which benefits Black considerably. Not only does White lose too much territory, but the follow-up sequence from White 'a' to White 'g' will not work, since the ladder is good for Black. This is out of the question as well.




Dia. 5

11: connects

What would happen if White played 1 in *Dia. 5*? This was the first variation I analyzed. It seems as if the sequence to White 13 is inevitable. White ends in gote and Black 'a' is big enough to wrap up the game.

I read out a large number of variations, but I couldn't come up with a good one. Then I found White 2 and 4 in *Dia. 6*. If Black 5 at 6,

White connects at 8; this is not good for Black. So Black has no choice but to push through and break into the top with 5 and 7. After this, unlike *Dia. 5*, White has a good follow-up with the sequence to 18. Not only is this territorially beneficial, but White can also omit playing 'a'. So I attached at 32 with great expectations.



Dia. 6

Nonetheless, Satoru seemed to ignore my concerns and pushed on with the sequence to White 40. I felt like all the time and energy I spent to come up with White 32 was wasted. Black 41 was the sealed move; it was very good.




Figure 3 (40-54)


Figure 3 (40-54). Desperation

Black pushed at 41, inviting White 42. Black jumped to 43 and, after he cut at 49, White was in trouble.

Now I can see that it is not unusual to play 41 without the sacrifice of Black 52, but I did not exercise enough caution with regard to Black 41. If Black played 1 in *Dia. 7*, sacrificing


three stones first, White would immediately atari at 2, which White desperately wants to play.

After White 6, White aims at a peep at 'a' and this black group becomes a burden. In short, Black 1 makes his group heavy.



Dia. 7

Simply pushing at Black 41 without playing the exchanges in *Dia. 7*, is good because the threat of Black 52 still remains. If White safely extends to 1 in *Dia. 8*, Black 2 and 4 make solid thickness. Black can still play the sequence Black 'a'–White 'b'–Black 'c' to reduce White's territory in the corner; this territorial reduction is a big difference from *Dia. 7*.



Dia. 8

To return to the joseki analysis, the reason White 40 is supposed to be better than the usual joseki move at White 52 is that 40 gives White an atari at 2 in *Dia. 7*. After this exchange, White 'a' is a severe attack on this black group, but White did not get a chance to play it. Even if White ataried at 50 instead of extending to 44, Black would not respond, but attack the two white stones in the upper left first, then later aim at A to start a one-sided ko. Since the loss of this ko fight is bad only for White, before Black starts the ko fight, White has to resolve it by capturing at 51. This means that White will have spent too many moves in this corner, which is not very effi-

cient. If I had been able to foresee this, I would have played 40 at 52. Then White could freely play the hane of 42 without worrying about the threat caused by the combination of the cut at Black 49 and Black 52. This is what I meant when I said I overvalued 40.

Black 43 forced White to answer at 46. Black 47 also was sente (without 48, Black B could be very severe). Black then cut at 49. Even though White finally played 50, it was not effective, since Black had already played 45 and 47, so there was no longer a threat against the black group on the upper left side.

So far Black had played exceedingly well, and I had a lost game. I became desperate.





Figure 4 (54-70)

Figure 4 (54-70). My best move

White 54 was a win-or-lose move. When I played it, I knew I had a lost game, but there was another reason for playing it.

Instead of White 54, the normal move is probably at A, but Black could very easily destroy White, even though I wasn't sure how Black would respond. Black doesn't have to expend much effort to attack this white stone, since he already has enough territory to maintain his considerable lead, not to mention that he has overwhelming thickness throughout the board. This means that Black would not have to play risky moves when attacking it. As I said before, Black has more territory and more thickness, so White would lose overwhelmingly. White 54, on the other hand, at least maintains the territorial balance.


After the game, Kobayashi said that he regretted connecting at 59 instead of simply connecting at 1 in *Dia. 9*. White would play the sequence to 8, then stake the game on the invasion of 10. It is unlikely that this stone would live, so I would have had to resign.



Dia. 9


This was my desperate plan. If I invaded at A instead of playing White 54, I probably could have lived, but, as I said, Black does not have to attack this stone very severely to win, whereas in *Dia. 9* the game will hinge on Black capturing the white stone at 10. So White 54 is a bad move, but I thought White would have more winning chances by following *Dia. 9*. It was my best move to make or break this difficult situation.

Satoru sensed my analyses and countered with 59. He played here because he expected that he could aim at Black B after 63 and 65. He was trying to create a situation where Black could overwhelm White territorially and win safely. Moreover, Black 63 and 65 would also attack the white stones in the center and solidify Black's territory there.



Dia. 10

Instead of 59, if Black connected at 61, White could not cut at 1 in *Dia. 10* because Black 2 would leave a severe cut at 'a'. This means that *Dia. 9* is the inevitable sequence. It is also possible to play Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11* (but Black couldn't play at 'a' because of White 'b'). Consequently, the fight from Black 63 is inevitable.



Dia. 11

When I went back to Tokyo, I heard comments that Black should have played at C instead of 69. It seems like an excellent idea, but Satoru played Black 69 as the move to decide the game. It certainly did put White into trouble.





Figure 5 (71-80)

Figure 5 (71-80). The aji of the cut


Up to this point, Black has been in control of the game, but in this figure White finally gets to see the light at the end of an apparently endless tunnel. The hane of Black 75 was a serious mistake. I had expected Black 1 in *Dia. 12* and read out the variations resulting from it. First I analyzed White 2 and 4. Black has no

choice but to play 5, and when White plays 6, he gets a good position, since escaping at White 8 is possible. If Black 9, White simply runs away with 10. Up to White 16, the vital six black stones will be captured. If Black plays 15 at 'a', White cuts at 'b', and the ladder starting with Black 'c' doesn't work.



Dia. 12

However, when I read out the variations again to confirm them, I discovered a good black response and was upset. Instead of 9 in *Dia. 12*, Black could attach at 1 in *Dia. 13*. In response to White 2, Black 3 is again a good counter and, up to Black 11, White's position collapses. If Black 3 at 9, White 4 is sente and, with White 7, the three black stones cannot escape. (Confirm this for yourself. As a hint, there is a ladder to consider.)



Dia. 13

As a result, the sequence from White 2 to 6 in *Dia. 12* doesn't work. This means that White should jump to 4 instead of 2, followed by the sequence Black 2–White 'b'–Black 6. In this result, the white group lacks eye shape, so this is not good for White.

Since Black played the hane of 75, White cut at 76, which was bad for Black for several reasons. First, as a result of White 78, it became possible for White to jump to 80 instead of A. Second, Black B becomes a powerful move, as I will explain in more detail later. Third, the marked stone in *Dia. 14* helps White to easily invade the right side with the sequence to 7. The marked stone has *aji* because White 'a' can cause Black a lot of trouble. There is more trouble for Black, which I will explain later.

Compare the game with the variation in which Black played 75 at 76, followed by White A–Black 75, and you will understand how terrible Black 75 was.






Figure 6 (81–104)

Figure 6 (81–104). The position now favors White.

The marked stone generates a lot of bad *aji* for Black, so it must have been quite aggravating to Satoru. After White 82, an ordinary follow-up would be at Black 84, but White would push at 83, followed by Black A and White 86. The white group would then be almost safe and White would next aim at C, making the cut at B effective. To forestall this, Black had to play 83.




Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Black has another possible choice: 1 and 3 in *Dia. 15*, even though these moves make professionals uncomfortable, because Black 1 fills a liberty of his three stones. After Black 5, if White 'a', Black 'b' would be perfect. But White 'c' would not affect any of the black stones, so that would not be a good response.




Dia. 16

I planned to answer Black 3 in *Dia. 15* with White 1 in *Dia. 16*. If Black answered with 2 at 5, White would connect at 2 and he could fight on equal terms. If Black 2 at 8, White plays at 'a'. This is much better than *Dia. 15*, in which Black answers White 'a' with 'b', so Black must cut with 2 and 4 in *Dia. 16*. White can now take a big profit with 7 in sente, and jump to 9. The white group in the center probably

won't be captured and White has various forcing moves such 'b'. If Black omits 8, White will escape with 8 and, with the threat at 'c', it is quite severe on Black. Even in this variation, the marked white stone is effective.

Black 87 defends against White D.

When I connected at 88, I felt that Satoru's fighting spirit abruptly evaporated. He played 89, then switched to 91. He must have felt desperate when he played 93 and 95.



Dia. 17 12: takes ko

If Black responds to White 90 with E, the sequence in Dia. 17 follows. White 2, 4, and 6 do not give Black any choice. After the exchange to 6, White finally ataris at 8. Black ataris at 9, then the ko starts with 12, but Black does not have any ko threat as big as White 'a', which captures the eleven black stones. Again, the marked stone is effective.


In the lower right corner, Black F still remains. When I played the sequence up to White 104, I was certain that I would win.

Once Black attaches at 97, there is only one follow-up sequence. I think Black 103 instead of 97 complicates the position, but Satoru probably ran out of energy and could no longer put up any more resistance.

Figure 7 (105–136). *Being desperate was my good fortune.*

I'd like to point out one more thing in Figure 6. Black could counter with 2 in Dia. 18 to link up his stones at the bottom. But White could then jump out to 5 with his two stones and the black group in the center is in great danger. Even in this diagram, White will probably not lose.

Instead of Black 107, starting a capturing race with Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 19 does not work. White saves his stones with 4, aiming to link up with his stones on the left with White 'a'. Black 5 prevents the connection, but White 6 and 8 win the capturing race.



Dia. 18






Figure 7 (105–136)



Dia. 19

At the top, Black 1 in Dia. 20 does not succeed. In the sequence to White 16, the capturing race ends in White's favor; White 10 and 12 turn the two liberties of the five white stones into four.



Dia. 20

When White peeped at 136, Satoru resigned. In answer to Black A, the sequence White B–Black C–White D follows and makes White E and F *miai*. With White F, the entire black group at the bottom will die.

In this game, I became desperate early in the fuseki, for Satoru played very well. White 54 in Figure 4 was not exactly a win-or-lose move; rather, it was what I could do best and I staked the game on it. It was effective. Go is a game in which you tend to choose a bad move when you are winning: the more aware you are that you have a won game, the more strongly you try to attain victory, thus the more cautious you become and try to play the safest move to ensure victory. But players often make the worst choices in such situations. I was desperate in the beginning, but this turned out to be good for me and brought me victory.

Black resigns after White 136.

*'I was under pressure
from the very first moves.'*


Kobayashi Satoru, former Kisei

I am very tired now. People often say winning a game wipes out the exhaustion, but I think even if I had won the seventh game, I would still be as tired as I am now.

Frankly, I'm very frustrated by my defeat, but I did my utmost throughout the series, so I have no regrets. Instead, I feel that a great burden has been taken from my shoulders.

I played Cho six games last year and seven games this year. I think I did much better this year than last year. I really liked the first four games in this series. These four games are the

product of my go created during these past years, and games five, six, and seven are the product of my entire go career. The figure here is from the fourth game at the beginning of the second day. Even now I see White 7 and 9 as daring moves.



Game 4

In the past, I would have played 7 at 'a' without much thought and would have never even considered a move like 9. Until recently, if you were to describe my go in a positive way, you would say it was thick. If you were negative, you would say it was lukewarm. But I played these moves most likely because, thanks to my games with Cho, I have become aware of the importance of territory, territorial bases, and attacks. I particularly like these two moves.


Playing with Cho requires fierceness. In each of the seven games, I felt under I was pressure from the very first moves. Cho always plays moves to the maximum of his ability. His spirit and determination are so enormous that I expect to be cut to pieces in every game.

I hope I can challenge him again — no, I *will* challenge him again by renewing my strength and energy.

*Through the Eyes of Ishida Yoshio
Challenging with Power*

It is not worthwhile discussing the first game: Cho fell victim to 'Cho Chikun Disease'

and quickly lost. It is said that players really get serious when they return to Japan. At least they gave us a lot of excitement in the fierce fights from the second game on, satisfying our expectation to see some fascinating games.



Game 2

It is truly a historical event that a new pattern like this arose in a title match. To begin with, attaching at 7 is rare. So is wedging in at 8. There were many variations: White could play 14 at 18, followed by Black 14 and White 19. But after the now famous *chinshinto* move of Black 27, the sequence to Black 43 is inevitable. It is doubtful if this pattern will ever be played again, but at least it gives us a guide.

The players both claimed that it turned out bad for White, but I think it is hard to assess exactly how bad it was.

Satoru clearly jumped into the kind of game where Cho fights best; Satoru played all-out, trying to compete in power against Cho. It was as if he wanted to prove to the world that by defeating Cho in his kind of game, he would be the undisputed winner. Satoru's determination continued in the third and fourth games.

White's masterpiece

Yet, his overly aggressive attitude accelerated and he could not stop it by himself. As a result, he destroyed himself and was forced into *kadoban*. While he willingly played free and uninhibited strategies, making for in-

triguing games, the results weren't even close; it was rather clear that Cho took a clear lead in each of these games.

Cho should have overwhelmed Satoru in the second and fourth games, but Cho gave him chances in the latter parts of those games. Since he did not win overwhelmingly, I was not sure if he was really in top condition.

Game Five

Black's stones flow like a river.

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Kobayashi Satoru Kisei

Played in Misawa, Aomori prefecture, on March 6-7, 1996.

Commentary by Takagi Shoichi 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-25)

Figure 1 (1-25). *The problem of invasion*

The formation of Black 3, 5, and 7 is one of Kobayashi's favorite patterns. He also likes to play *niren-sei*.

White 10 seems to be a new move. Normally, Black would play at A. The reason it is normal is that when Black enters the 3-3 point, White can surround Black 5 on a larger scale. But if White plays A, Black can make *sabaki* with Black 20 instead of invading at the 3-3 point. I assume that White played 10 to prevent this *sabaki*.

Cho extended to 14 on the fourth line instead of B on the third line, which is more

usual. However, White 14 is not really Cho's preference. He probably played this move because White B invites Black C, which he didn't like.

Invading at the 3-3 point with 19 after White plays 16 and 18 is good timing. The flow of this game now seems to favor Black. Playing 16 at D also makes the corner invasion good. These problems stem from White 10; when Black connects at 25, the position of White 10 is neither urgent nor important.





Figure 2 (26-46)

Figure 2 (26-46). The ordinary move is unsatisfactory.

White 26 is surprising. The normal move is White 1 in Dia. 1. But Cho probably did not like the follow-up sequence to Black 4, which works well for Black. Indeed, Black 4 is the normal move and, if such a move makes White dissatisfied, then there is already something wrong with his fuseki.




Dia. 1

Black 27 is an interesting move. It discourages White from making an extension at the top. If Black played 27 at 35, White A would be an appropriate extension. Still, Black 27 at

35 would be good. Cho said that he expected Black to play 27 at 35, and he was going to answer with A. He did not consider Black 27.

Since Black played the large knight's move, White had no choice but to invade at 28.



Dia. 2

It was said that if White made life with 1 and 3 in Dia. 2, Black 2 and 4 would be good moves. I thought Black 2 should be at 'a', but the combination of 2 and 4 is better.

White intentionally starts a ko fight with 38, expecting Black to answer his ko threat at 42, but...





Figure 3 (47-73)

Figure 3 (47-73). Black takes a big lead.

It is said Cho did not see Black 47 and 49, but I cannot believe that.

White 50 is the only move. If White 1 in Dia. 3, Black 2 would become sente and, with 4, the two white stones would be captured. If White 1 in Dia. 4, Black would also capture them with 2, 4, and 6.

Black is happy to push through with 51 and 53 because it gives him a thick shape on the right side.



Dia. 3

Dia. 4

Even if White extended to 62 instead of 54, Black would still play the hane at 55.

Black 55 is a calm move. If Black ataried at 62 instead, Black B would no longer be sente.

If White played 60 at 65 or 67, he could capture the black stone at the bottom, but Black would counter with 60 to increase the size of his territory on the right side, which is larger than White's territory at the bottom. Black's territory in the upper right corner is bigger than it looks.

Making sabaki with Black 61 and 63 is also good. The flow of the black stones is smooth.

Black 69 also makes good shape.

Even if White connected at 71 with 70, Black could easily make life for his corner group with C.

After Black 73, Cho must have had a hard time finding an appropriate move.





Figure 4 (74-100)

Figure 4 (74-100). No effective attack

It is painful for White not to have an effective


attack on the black group at the bottom. But White caps at 74 anyway. Instead of 74, White 1 in Dia. 5 might look severe, but there is no good follow-up after Black 2.



Dia. 5

Black did not answer White 74, but switched to 75 and 77, which were thick moves.

White 78 was the sealed move. It was a passive move. Cho must have felt frustrated not having an attack on the black group at the bottom even after Black played elsewhere. Instead of 78, White 1 in Dia. 6 is a vital point, but Black can make a good shape with 2 and 4. If White 3 at 4, Black 3 would capture him.



Dia. 6

In response to Black 79, connecting at White 91 would let Black invade the 3-3 point in the upper left corner. Defending it with White 97 would allow Black to cut at 96.

White 80 intends to give up the attack on the black group at the bottom and to thicken the outside instead.

Black 99 at A seems to be the easiest way to clinch the game. By playing here Black would win by more than ten points, excluding the komi.

Figure 5 (101-147). A simple mistake

If Black played 101 at A, followed by White B, then captured at 4, White's fighting spirit

would probably evaporate. When he played White 4, Cho's spirit was renewed again.





Figure 5 (101-147)

Black 5 and 7 erased all the bad *aji*.

Although aware that White 24 was an improper move, White plays it anyway in order to make even a little more profit regardless of the bad *aji* it creates. However, White is disappointed that he can't cut at C after Black 27.

Instead of 32, White can link up his stones with White 1 in *Dia. 7*, but he can't kill this group. Even if White connected at 7, Black 10 would be a fancy response; if White 'a', Black lives in sente by drawing back to 'b'; if White 'b', Black 'a' links up the black groups.



Dia. 7

Dia. 8

Up to Black 37, both sides played the best moves. Black can always live, since Black D is a forcing move.

Black 39 was a simple mistake. If Black played the sequence to White 6 in *Dia. 8*, he could link up with Black 7. If White 8, Black 9

to 17 would capture the white stones, so White would have to play 8 at 17, followed by Black 8 and White 'a'. This outcome would be far more profitable for Black than in the game.

The sequence from Black 41 to 45 doesn't incur any loss; it does create some bad *aji* for White, however.

Figure 6 (148-191). *The decisive move*

When White tries to reduce Black's territorial moyo with 48, Black 49 becomes the decisive move. Satoru later said, 'I breathed a sigh of relief when I found it.' Instead of 49, if he retreated to Black 58, the game would become very close.

In answer to Black 51, White has no choice but to connect at 52, so Black pushes through with 53.





Figure 6 (148-191)

White 54 and 56 are the only way to defend. For example, if White defended at 1 in *Dia. 9*, Black could cut off the white group in the center with the sequence to 8.

It must have felt good to peep at Black 57. White 62 seems to have been played to set the scene for resignation.

After Black connects at 81, he is able to cut through with the sequence Black A-White B-Black C.

Satoru could cut at A and the white group would probably die, but he seems to be determined not to create complications which might put his victory in jeopardy.



Dia. 9

Instead of White 90, Cho should have linked up with B, but Black would play 90 and capture two white stones. White's defeat would then become clear.

This was a convincing victory for Satoru. He played very few bad moves.

White resigns after Black 191

Game Six

White: Kobayashi Satoru Kisei

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Played in Matsumoto, Nagano, on March 13-14, 1996.


Commentary by Takagi Shoichi 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-20). A recently popular approach

The two-space high approach at 6 has become popular recently.

Instead of Black 11, the sequence Black A-White B-Black C is also possible.

Most professionals play Black 17 one line higher, but Cho likes to play 17. It is also possible to approach at 20, which would be followed by White D-Black E. I might choose this variation.



Dia. 1




Figure 1 (1-20)

If Black neglects to play 19, White would play 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 1*. White 5 creates a *moyo* at the top which is quite wide. White would be satisfied. After this, White 'a' is a good follow-up move. Attaching at White 2 instead of 1, followed by Black 1-White 3, is supposed to be severe, but in this case the result would be unfavorable.



Kobayashi Satoru in deep thought during Game Six

Figure 2 (21–38). *A worrisome miai*

Playing Black 21 at A is also a good point. If Black had played at A, White would have extended to B. If Black had played 21 at C, White would have capped at 26.

White 22 and 24 are typical Satoru-style moves. He is good at confining his opponent's stones; he plays better when his opponent's stones are isolated instead of joined together in a cohesive unit.

In terms of fighting spirit, Black 25 should be at A?





Figure 2 (21–38)

White 26 is a wonderful point, but, according to Ishida Akira, it is also possible to play 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 2*. I agree with him.



Dia. 2

Black 27 is a big, bulging move.

White 28 and 30 are mild moves. They are also typical of Satoru's style. However, they

erase the possibility of invading at D, so not many professionals would play them.

The moves from Black 31, giving White territory, are not really Cho's preference, but he probably played them because he wanted some influence in the center of the board before invading the left side. If Black invaded at E instead of 31, White might very well expand his moyo with F. However, White is still satisfied with the sequence to 38.




Figure 3 (39–62)


Figure 3 (39–62). *Mistakes in the fight*

Black now invaded at 39.

Cho made *sabaki* from 41 to 49. It was such a skillful way to make life. Nevertheless, Black 57 was unnecessary and dangerous. He should have immediately made life with A, but White missed a chance by playing 58 and 60. White should have played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3* and, in response to Black 4, White 5 is the strongest counter. White makes a ko threat at 7; if Black ends the ko fight with 8, White hanes at 9. The position now favors White.

Instead of Black 8, answering White 7 with Black 1 in *Dia. 4* would force Black to connect at 3 since he has no ko threats. White 4 would then take an eye away from Black's group and it would be in big trouble. Since White could link up at 'a', the black group might have a hard time making life.

In contrast, White 60 is a thinner connection with C, which allows Black to play 62 in sente. Hence, this group is not so easily killed.



Dia. 3

Dia. 4





Figure 4 (63-71)


Figure 4 (63-71). The game turns in White's favor.

Black 63 and 65 were serious mistakes, giving White the connection at 64 with good *aji*. Black should have made life with 1 in Dia. 5. If White tries to kill the black group, by reducing it to one eye with 4 and 8, Black will counter with 11 and 13. After Black 17, the exchange of White 'a' for Black 'b' fills a liberty of the five white stones and they will die. Therefore, living with Black 1 is a success and the game is even. This mistake must have upset Cho after he noticed it during the game.



Dia. 5

When White extends to 68, the game begins to favor White. Instead of Black 69, Cho said during the post-mortem discussion that he should have played the sequence to 9 in Dia. 6. But White could play 2 at 'a' and try to capture Black. It is hard to predict what will happen, though, so this move is scary for Black as well. Therefore, it's hard to say whether or not Black 1 is good. I think Black 69 at A is also possible. Indeed, Cho misread the variations after Black 69.



Dia. 6

Black 71 at B would leave Black with bad *aji* after White D and White C.

Figure 5 (72-100). Regrettable gote

White 72 was a wonderful move.

Instead of Black 73, it is more natural to cut at 1 in Dia. 7, but White 2 and 4 would increase White's territory and leave cutting points after White 'a'.

Black has to defend with 81. Cho made a mistake in his analysis in that he thought he would end in sente. However, he ends in gote. Instead of 81, White 1 in Dia. 8 would also be possible. Even if Black cut at 2, up to 15 White could make life. If Black 16, White 17 and 19 would make 'a' and 'b' *miai*.

When White seals off the bottom with the sequence from 82 to 86, White's big lead becomes clear. Since Black is behind, he has to step in at 87 to reduce White's territory.






Figure 5 (72-100)



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

White could counter Black 87 more severely, but White 88 implies that taking the territory in the lower right corner is enough to win. The white territory from the right side to the bottom left is so big that White is way ahead.

White has been aiming at 100 for a long time. Black's territory in the upper left will be reduced, so it is very painful for Black.

Figure 6 (101-178). Taking no risks

After the exchange of Black 1 for White 2, Black has to retreat to 3 and 5. Were Black to play 3 at 1 in *Dia. 9*, White would escape with 2. After Black 3, White would cut at 4 and atari at 6. If Black connects, White 'a' kills the black stones. Notice that White 'b' is now possible.

White 6 is a big endgame move.

Black 7 is a desperate invasion. Black has to do something outrageous if he is to catch up with White.

When White played 8, everyone was won-

dering whether or not the black stone could escape.





Figure 6 (101-178)



Dia. 9

White could play the knight's move at 20 instead of 12 and swallow up all the black stones. But Satoru didn't play that way because he thought it would be less risky to win without killing them.

Since the black group links up with 27, the margin of White's lead has been narrowed.

I thought White 48 in the center clinched White's victory, but according to Ishida Yoshio 9-dan, White should have defended with 67 instead of 54. If Black had played 55 at 67, the game would have become favorable for Black.

If the game had been played out to the end, White would have won by 4 1/2 points.

In the endgame, White played a bit too cautiously, but Satoru played an excellent middle game, maintaining his lead and winning a won game.

Black resigned after White 178.

(Kido, May 1996. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

The 34th Judan Title Match: Game Four

Yoda Norimoto vs. O Rissei

Yoda Tenaciously Defends His Title

Yoda's victory in the third game was one-sided, but his play in the first and second games were terrible. His win in the first game was big only because O made a mistake in the endgame and he was completely defeated in the second game. The day before the third game he was in such a horrible condition that he was unable to eat. Yet he won, thereby regaining his confidence.

The fourth game of this best-of-five title match was a tenacious struggle, but after 221 moves Yoda won by half a point, his first defense of the Judan title by a score of 3-1.

Prior to this title match, he had been losing in other tournaments and was worryingly asking, 'Why do I lose even though I am studying so hard?' In the final analysis, he decided to believe in his go and defended this title as if his life depended on it.

White: Yoda Norimoto Judan

Black: O Rissei Oza

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 5 hours each.

Played in Aichi prefecture on April 11, 1996.

Figure 1 (1-46). A slow pace

In the first three games of this match, both Yoda and O played their opening moves extremely fast. But in this game, they played the fuseki at a snail's pace.

Yoda played 10 a line lower in the second game, but in this game he chose 10.

White 18 and 20 were played to make the black two-space extension overconcentrated.

On seeing Black 29, Baba Shigeru 9-dan, the referee for this game, commented that it was a thick move. White then invaded at 30 and the fireworks began. According to the professionals observing the game in the press-room, White played here because Black was taking the lead in territory and drastic measure had to be taken to stop it.

Yoda's thinking must have been as follows: since he couldn't find a move to prevent

a black invasion of his moyo at the top, he had to invade the black moyo at the bottom first.





Figure 1 (1-46)

Black played 31 to rob the two white stones on the right side of their territorial base. Baba as well as some of the other professionals watching said that they would never play a move on the second line in a position like this. But Yoda described this move differently. He argued that since it was hard to decide how to attack the white stone at the bottom, attacking the two white stones on the right side with 31 indirectly puts pressure on the white stone at the bottom.

Black played 35 to keep the two white groups on the right and at the bottom separated; the game suddenly became tense.

Instead of Black 37, retreating to 38 would be lukewarm. Since Black is attacking the white group, he should not be aggressive.

Black 39 and 41 were the right responses as well. If Black played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1*, Black would capture the two white stones, but White 4 and 6 would become forcing moves and the white group would become strong; the game would then be over.



Dia. 1

The order of White 42 and 44 was clever, forcing Black to make bad shape with 45.

The lunch break came while Black was thinking about 47. The middle game was going to be quite complex.




Figure 2 (47-100)

Figure 2 (47-100). A regrettable move


After the game resumed, Ogata, on seeing Black 47 on the TV monitor in the press room, cried out, 'Big'. Since connecting at 48 would be disadvantageous for Black, he played 47.

When White cut at 48, everyone in the press room was surprised, doubting that it was playable. It appeared that Black 49 split the white groups, but Yoda was confident about the cut as the best move in this position.

White 50 was a beautiful *sabaki tesuji*. Black 51 was the strongest countermove, but White took the three black stones. Thus, the two thin white groups joined up and became very thick. Yoda now thought that he was ahead.

Instead of Black 63, escaping with the three black stones would only create a target for White, so when White peeped at 62, Black did not really have a choice but to sacrifice them. Perhaps O should have played 57 at 58 to cut off and attack the white stones on the right. Then again, Black might have played 63 at 77 to capture the two white stones, followed by White 64. As it was, Black's stones at 63, 65, and 67 only became heavy. These were the arguments that went on in the press room. Interestingly, O later claimed that he sacrificed the three black stones because he thought the game favored him.

White 76 is usually regarded as a crude peep and peeping a line above is correct. But in this case, 76 was the right move.




Dia. 2

White then made a detour by cutting at 78. Instead, White A would have been a marvelous move. If Black connected at 2 in Dia. 2, White would jump to 3. It would be a long treacherous journey for Black to join up with his allies in the upper right corner, so he would not have a chance to invade the white moyo at the top. Since Black was not going to link up with 78, there was no reason for White to cut. In addition, with 1 in Dia. 2, White could play the sequence White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c' or White 'd' in sente. Just playing White 'a' itself in sente would be profitable.

Suddenly, O played Black 81, a very regrettable move.

During the post-mortem discussion he repeatedly criticized this move. Black should have played the sequence from 1 to 11 in *Dia. 3* instead, and he would have had a clear lead.



Dia. 3

In the game, White 82 and 84 were powerful moves and Black 81 was captured without any compensation. The professionals in the pressroom began to say the game was tilting in White's favor.

Black 85 was a good move; White could not cut this stone off.




Figure 3 (101-221)

61: at 42

Figure 3 (101-221). An unconquerable half point

From White 48 a fierce endgame began. In

the press room Ogata was the leader of the discussion and each of the two game recorders, Nakane Yohei 5-dan and Shimojima Yohei 2-dan, were coming in and out of the room heatedly calculating the outcome. One group claimed that Black was ahead by half a point, others that White was leading by 2 1/2 or 3 1/2 points. Somebody finally sighed, 'the endgame is really hard to understand.' But after a while Ogata 9-dan and others reached the consensus that White would win by half a point.

Yoda, on the other hand, was confident of victory after cutting off Black 81 in the previous figure.

White 64 was a tesuji. If Black 65 at 67, White 65 would have reduced Black's territory with sente. Black responded with 65, so White could link up with his stone below with 68.

The players continued the game to the end without taking the dinner break. White finally won by half a point.

Yoda also took the Judan title last year by winning the third and final game by half a point against Otake 9-dan. While he fully used his five-hour time limit and played the endgame cautiously, he might have remembered that game in the last title match, which he won by the same margin.

'I'm very tired and my head is now empty. This past month I thought only about this best-of-five match,' Yoda said to an interviewer after the game was over. He also murmured, 'I want to get a little bit stronger.'

During the post-mortem discussion, O poured over the board, trying to discover the reason for his loss. The fighting spirit of these two talented players will no doubt clash again sometime in the future.

White won by half a point.


(Go Weekly, April 23, 1996, Kido, June, 1996, and Igo Club, June, 1996. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

New Moves and New Josekis

The Purpose of the Peep

by Abe Yoshiteru

This position is from one of Kobayashi Reiko's last games; it is from the Women's Kakusei tournament and was played on July 31, 1995. Her opponent was Ogawa Tomoko (White), who had just been promoted to 6-dan.




Figure


The peep at Black 1 used to be frequently played by Kajiwar Takeo 9-dan as a counter-strategy to the Chinese opening. But in this fuseki, it was played for a different purpose.

Dia. 1 (The departure point)

Because the marked white stone had been played, Black approached from the outside at 1 and White answered with 2. Instead of White 2, the pincer at 'a' is also often played.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2


Dia. 2 (A common pattern)

Continuing with Black 1 and 3 is a common joseki. If Black has a stone in the upper left corner, Black 'a', instead of 1, is another


possibility. In this game, White has a stone in the top left, so White could also play 2 at 'b'.

Dia. 3 (Kajiwar style)

When White plays the marked stone in the Chinese opening, Kajiwar peeps at 1. In that case, Black always has a stone in the top left corner, so he peeps to see how White will respond before making an extension on the left. For example, if White 'a', Black extends to 'b', aiming to crawl at Black 'c' later on. If White 'c' or 'd', Black extends to 'b', and later the jump to Black 'e' will be a forcing move.




Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (What happened in the game: 1)

In answer to Black 1, White connected at 2. The new strategy is to immediately invade the 3-3 point with 3. White, of course, blocked at 4, and Black played the hane of 5 to see how White would respond.



Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (Blocking from the inside)

Instead of White 2 in Dia. 4, if White had blocked from the inside at 1, Black would have extended to 2. In this case, Black would not invade at the 3-3 point anymore, but she could invade at 'b' even without Black 'a'.

(Continued on page 55.)

The 51st Honinbo Title Match

Cho Chikun vs. Ryu Shikun

A New Star Becomes the Honinbo Challenger

by Otake Hideo

This year's Honinbo title match featured a new challenger: Ryu Shikun. This was the first time for Ryu to play in a best-of-seven match. Cho, on the other hand, along with Kobayashi Koichi, is one of the two most experienced and successful best-of-seven match players. Even so, this was going to be a fascinating series. Ryu was the first player from the younger generation to take a title from a player of the older generation, when he beat Rin Kaiho for the Tengen title. He then defended it against the Kobayashi Koichi. Everyone was wondering how he was going to do against the great Cho Chikun, a player who, like Ryu, also came from Korea to make his career in Japan.


Some Japanese go fans have complained that this title match does not generate much excitement because neither of the two contestants is Japanese. It is understandable that they would rather see a Japanese compete for this traditional Japanese title, but I don't really like to hear these kinds of complaints. It is true that they come from Korea, but they are both players who were trained in Japan and are products of Japanese go. Perhaps this is why Cho declared his determination on the eve of this match as follows:

'I came to Japan because I thought Japanese go was the strongest. I think Ryu came to Japan for the same reason. But we, the players in Japan, have been consistently losing in international tournaments for a long time now. I'd like to play games which will demonstrate that Japanese go is the still strongest.'

Both Cho and Ryu worry about the future of Japanese go. They both work hard to improve its level by teaching the children who will be the go professionals of the future. The reason is, no doubt, that they see themselves as heirs to the great tradition of Japanese go. I wish Japanese go fans would support them

more warmly. But I have digressed.

Now, I would like you to look at the highlight of the second game in the Reference Diagram. The move that delighted me most was Ryu's move at Black 1. Regardless of whether this move is good or bad, it is fascinating to see a gutsy move like this played in a best-of-seven title match. From this move alone, his unorthodox talent is apparent.



Reference Diagram

Game One

A Special Commentary

by Rin Kaiho

White: Ryu Shikun Tengen

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each

Commentary by Rin Kaiho

Figure 1 (1-11). *A fierce opening clash*

I have played both Cho and Ryu in title matches. Cho's style is to gain as much territory in the beginning as possible, then to stake the game on *shinogi* (securing life for a group under severe attack), a technique of which he is an unequaled master. To me, his *shinogi* often looks dangerous, but he never seems to

feel that way. What a troublesome guy he is!

Ryu is also troublesome because he does not seem to have any weaknesses. His go is well balanced: the quickness of his reading ability is remarkable and he is also good at the endgame. He is an all-around player.




Figure 1 (1-11)


Both Cho and Ryu played a really interesting first game. First, a fierce fight broke out in the bottom right corner. Then, because of a ladder, the fighting spread to the upper left corner. Some people saw this game as a clash of the players' fighting spirit, but I saw it differently. I will explain this later in Figure 4. The severity of the fight at the beginning is especially noteworthy: such fights are rare in title matches. There are still things I don't understand, but I would like to go over it with the readers of this magazine anyway.

In contrast to the *sanren-sei*, the Chinese opening of Black 1, 3, and 5 is more territory-oriented. The position of the stone on the 3-4 point in the bottom right corner is good in relation to Black 5 and, if this corner becomes Black's territory without his having to make a corner enclosure, it will be ideal for Black.


It is rare to see White 6 nowadays. When Black pincers with 7, White will have difficulty finding a good response, so playing 6 at 7 is more usual.

When Black pincers at 7, it is tempting to attach at 8. Now Black has two choices.

If Black hanes at 2 in *Dia. 1*, the sequence up to White 7 can be expected. In this trade, White gets the territory in the corner while Black gets outside influence.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2


The hane at 2 in *Dia. 2* is more severe. In response to White 3, Black 4 and 6 put the white stones in trouble. This variation has been played in professional games, but none of the results was favorable for White.



Dia. 3

What about White 1 in *Dia. 3*? Up to Black 12, White does not gain thickness; the white stones will become targets for Black to attack. If White 13, Black 14 is a tesuji, followed by White 'a' and Black 'b'. The position of the marked black stones is ideal.

White 1 in *Dia. 4* is too mild. After White 3, Black can take the initiative with 4 and 6.



Dia. 4





Figure 2 (12-28)

Figure 2 (12-28). Lee Chang-ho's move


Lee Chang-ho was the first to play White 12. Black 13 was the mildest response, after which the sequence up to White 28 was inevitable. This was a satisfactory result for White.




Dia. 5

Instead of 13, Black 1 in *Dia. 5* leads to the most complicated variation. The sequence to White 10 is almost forced. White should not try to make life in the corner; it takes more than one move to make life there. Instead, White should use the stones in the corner to gain the advantage in the center.

After *Dia. 5*, if Black plays 1 in *Dia. 6* White will capture the four black stones with 2, so Black has to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 7* in order to capture the white stones in the corner. The two white stones at the bottom can then break out into the center with 4 and 6, then White can switch to 8 to defend the center group. The focus of the fighting will now be on how much Black will be able to harass the white group in the center, but it seems to me that there is not any good move to do so.




Dia. 6



Dia. 7


Another thing I should point out: the black corner looks big, but White can reduce it in sente with 'a', so it is not really that big. Thus, Lee Chang-ho's move seems very effective.

The game continued rather quietly. As I said before, the result was satisfactory for White. The reasons are as follows.




Dia. 8

First, White can still aim to play White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8* to make a ko. Since this is a two-step ko, it will take a while for these black stones to come under a direct threat. Still, it is an annoyance to Black.



Dia. 9

White can even aim to play 1 and 3 in *Dia.* 9. If Black 4, White 5 and 7 create a seki in the corner. This would be terrible for Black.



Dia. 10

Therefore, Black has to descend to 1 in *Dia.* 10. White 2 then becomes a forcing move, causing problems for the three black stones above. If White pushes at 'a', Black has to answer, but this push increases the pressure on the marked stone. Moreover, White 'b', threatening to link up at 'c', is almost a forcing move, but the two white stones can even make life with 'c'. This result is good for White.

Figure 3 (29–40). Correct timing

Black 29 is an important move. White has many ways to exploit the *aji* in the corner, so he doesn't want to sacrifice his three key stones there. If Black were to play this move after White took advantage of Black's weakness in the corner and gained some profit, White might very well sacrifice them. Therefore, now is the right time for Black to peep. I would also play this move. Black 1 in *Dia.* 11 doesn't have much effect. White defends at 2, and Black's position is not good.






Figure 3 (29–40)



Dia. 11


White 30 was the strongest response. White knew that the cut at A wouldn't work because of the ladder resulting from the sequence White B to White F. Needless to say, connecting at A instead of White 30 is not good. It would be extremely submissive and also make poor eye shape for White's group.




Dia. 12

White 2 in *Dia.* 12 is also possible. Black captures a stone with 3 and 5; Black also aims to push through with 'a'. But White can cap at 6 and defend this weakness. As long as he can cap there, he should be satisfied. Ryu was aware of this, but he must have wanted to fight with the strongest move at 30.

Black 31 is the severest move to break the ladder. After this, the game became truly wild.




Dia. 13



Dia. 14

If Black tries to break the ladder with 3 in *Dia. 13*, White would be happy to resolve the problem with 4. Among the many other double approaches, Black 3 and 5 are the harshest, but in this case, White's position at the bottom is so good that Black would be dissatisfied. Hence, Black chose the severest ladder-breaking move. If White responded with 1 in *Dia. 14*, the sequence to White 9 would follow. The result might be a bit favorable for White, but Black could play this way.



Dia. 15

But Ryu exerted himself, trying to play the severest moves. White 38 and 40 were played to increase Black's loss. This is an important point. As a result of playing 38, White has to lose his three key stones in the lower right corner. White gains profit in the upper left corner, but he has to lose something in the other corner since the ladder becomes unfavorable for him. The question I have is if Ryu knew that he was going to sacrifice his three stones, why didn't he play White 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 15* to reduce Black's territory in the corner? During the game, he might have thought

twice about making these exchanges, but I think this was an effective option.

Figure 4 (41–63). Reason, not emotion

The climax is coming. Black suffered a substantial loss in the upper left, so White was satisfied and willing to sacrifice his three stones in the lower right corner. Some people will say that a clash of fighting spirits caused this result, but to me it was an inevitable sequence. The words 'fighting spirit' are very emotional, but emotions had little to do with this result. Rather, the players did not really have a choice. Their thinking was as follows: 'The peep of Black 29 was the best timing. The ladder was in White's favor, so he responded to the peep with the strongest move. Since the ladder was bad for Black, he tried to turn it in his favor. Black's loss in the upper left corner was so big that White decided to take the black stones there.' This was the reasoning that directed the flow of this game.






Figure 4 (41–63)

Let's investigate the game a bit more. White played a very thick move with 42, erasing all bad *aji* there. But Black doesn't really have any good move which would have caused White problems. Therefore, I wonder why White couldn't have simply exchanged 1 for Black 2, then capped with 3 in *Dia. 16*. The best Black could do in the upper left corner is the sequence to White 9, so White should not be dissatisfied. White 42 in the game was not a bad move, however. It may not have been a pragmatic move, but it was the most elegant.



Dia. 16


Black 45 is a move I would have never thought of. Black 1 in *Dia. 17* would be the usual move. White would attach at 2 and cut at 4 to make *sabaki*. But up to 11, Black would be dissatisfied since he has failed to capture the three key white stones with 'a'. If White later got a chance to connect at 'a', the bad *aji* in the corner would come back to haunt Black. The meaning of Black 45 was to let the white group at the bottom escape and, in the process of pursuing it, capture the three white stones.



Dia. 17

Instead of 46, White might be tempted to connect at 1 in *Dia. 18*, but after Black 2 White would be unable to rescue both of his two groups. The aim White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c' would no longer be a threat to Black.

In the moves up to 62, White sacrificed all of his stones in the lower right corner. With Black 63, the shape is settled. After the storm subsided, it seemed to me that the result was still even. The way the black stones in the upper left corner were captured is terrible, so the position might look favorable for White at first glance. But the black territory in the lower right corner is worth more than 60 points. Black even managed to wedge in at 63 on the left side. The game could still go either way.



Dia. 18




Figure 5 (64–100)
69: captures at stone

Figure 5 (64–110). Creating *aji*

Black 87 and 89, creating *aji*, were exquisite moves. In retrospect, instead of the two-step hane at 72, it might have been better for White to have extended to 73.




Figure 6 (101–147)
32: throws in a 20; 33: connects at 22;
43: connects at 20

Figure 6 (101–147). *An insurmountable lead*

When Black captured with 1, he erased all of his bad *aji*. After Black hane and connected with 7 and 9, he had an insurmountable lead.

Figure 7 (148–233). *Black wins by 8 1/2 points.*

(Kido, July 1996, Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)




Figure 7 (148–233)
133: connects at 110

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Ryu Shikun Tengen

Commentary by Otake Hideo

Report by Hideyuki Kawakuma





Figure 1 (1–12)

Figure 1 (1–12). *Trying to outwit each other in the opening*

Cho's style is already well-known, so it is not necessary to discuss it. Ryu's style is, as far as I'm concerned, skillful and clever. He is good at assessing whole-board positions as well as calculating in the endgame. He is also fearless, not hesitating to engage in battle. He can be stubborn as well.




Dia. 1

Black 3 and 5 were played with the intention of forming the mini-Chinese opening with B, but White approached the lower right corner with 6 to thwart Black's plan. Indeed, Cho had already faced this opening as Black four days before this game; I was his opponent. It was a semifinal game in the Gosei title. When I approached with 6 in *Dia. 1*, Cho played the double approach moves of 5 and 7 and easily beat me.


Ryu must have studied this opening. In response to White 6, he answered at 7 rather than playing Cho's double approach moves. He seems to be saying to Cho, 'Don't you think Black 7 here is better?' I can infer from this move that Ryu's style can be aggressive. The meaning of this move is that Black will decide later whether to play a double approach at A or an extension around 12, depending on how White responds. This strategy seems skillful and is typical of Ryu. But was it good in this case?

Ryu expected White to answer with 1 in *Dia. 2*. Black would then extend to 2 or 'a', effectively diluting White's influence. After this, White aims to attach at the 3–3 point with

1 in *Dia. 3*. Black takes the corner with the sequence to 10. If White takes the two black stones with the ladder starting with 11, Black will play a ladder-breaking move in the upper left corner. If White plays 11 at 'a', White does not have to worry about the ladder, but Black escapes with 11, followed by White 'b'—Black 'c', capturing two white stones. This result is satisfactory for Black as well.




Dia. 2



Dia. 3 10: connects at 1

This is why Cho connected at 10. Now when White attaches at C, the hane of Black 11 is impossible. Thus, Black has to play 11 to prevent White C.



Dia. 4

The usual follow-up in this pattern is White 1 in *Dia. 4*, but Black would play 2. White's intention in playing 10 was to force Black to play 11. White could then pincer with 12 and Black can't play the opening strategy he has prepared. With the pincer of 12, Black, who thought he was going to have many ways to create a favorable position, is now constrained.

Figure 2 (13–23). *Favorable for White*

Ryu started the battle of wits at the bottom and it continued up to White 44 in the next figure. Other players might make a different assessment of this position, but I think White ended up with a favorable result.





Figure 2 (13–23)

Since White did not jump to 16, it is fighting spirit to play the double hane of 13 and 15.



Dia. 5

White makes the natural response to Black 13 and 15 with 16 and 18. If Black were to play the normal follow-up with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*, White would play 4 to attack the black stone. If Black cut at 'a', White would simply answer with 'b', so this is not a very troublesome situation for White. Since this sequence is not favorable for Black, he jumps to 19.

Originally, Black was happy to play the double hane of 13 and 15, but when White extended to 22, Black did not gain much. Now, he was not pleased to have to answer with 23. While Black 23 is inside, White 22 is outside, playing a strategic role throughout the board.

This extension will be of enormous benefit to White, so Ryu must certainly have been dissatisfied with this result.

Up to 23, it is my feeling that this is going to be a hard game for Black to win.





Figure 3 (24-44)

Figure 3 (24-44). White goes for thickness.


White 24 is played to see how Black will answer. Depending on how he plays, White will decide on which side to focus. If Black 25 at 26, White will aim at the attachment of A. In the game, White cuts at 26 and, with 30, he seals off the lower side in sente. He then strengthens his territory at the bottom with 34 and the following moves.



Dia. 6

What White is most afraid of in this position is the movement of the marked black stone. One purpose of White's moves is to forestall such movement. In response to Black 37, White could answer with 1 in Dia. 6, but the black group would make life. Moreover, a peep at Black 'a' remains, so White's position at the bottom is not as solid as in the game. Besides, White has a severe aim in the lower

left corner with 1 and 3 in Dia. 7. Since White 'a' forces Black to answer at 'b', in response to White 1, Black has no choice but to connect at 2. In addition, the black corner group does not have two eyes after White 3. At the moment, Black can escape into the center, so White cannot execute this tactic immediately. This aim indirectly deters Black from putting his marked stone in motion.



Dia. 7

Figure 4 (45-69). Ryu's confidence

Up to this point, I thought White had the better game, but Ryu seemed to be confident that Black's position was not bad. One indication of his confidence was that he played moves that are usually seen in the end game, such as the sequence from 45 to 50.





Figure 4 (45-69)


Instead of 48, White is not able to descend to 1 in Dia. 8; Black would jump to 2 and the *aji* of his marked stone could come into play. With the sequence to White 50, Black has reduced White's territory, but at the same time his position at the bottom has become thick,

so the *aji* of the marked stone has been largely erased. Playing Black 45 required courage.



Dia. 8

It should also be noted that Black 1 in *Dia. 9* is not a forcing move. White would play 2 and 4, ending in sente. If Black does not respond to 4, White can capture the three black stones by filling one of their liberties, so when Black plays 1 and 3, he must continue to reduce White's territory, starting with 'a', after which he must come back and defend at 'b'. Cho did not counter Black 45 partly because Black cannot reduce this territory in sente.




Dia. 9

With Black 51, the players return to the fuseki. Instead of answering 51, White 52 is a thick move. This cap has multiple purposes: to expand the left side territory, to prepare for an attack against the lower left corner, and to eliminate any possibility of the marked black stone causing trouble.

After White 52, Black has no choice but to jump to 53 and 55. White 56 seems like the best response, but if Black extends to 1 in *Dia. 10*, White 2 is a wonderful point to play.

When Black maps out the territory at the top with 57, White approaches in the upper right corner with 58. The rhythm of White's moves is good. There are other choices besides Black 59 and 61, but in this fuseki they are the most natural. It may seem more desirable for Black to play at A instead of 65 or 67. But with the cutting point at 67, Ryu did not think it

would be playable. Playing 65 and 67 was a calm and confident decision.



Dia. 10

Figure 5 (68–85). Black's raid

The focus of this game is now on how much territory Black can make at the top. However, there are some problems in White's position. Even though White has a cut at A, the pincer of Black B is quite big. Furthermore, an invasion at Black 80 on the left side is scary.





Figure 5 (68–85)


Beginning with an invasion at 68, Cho skillfully managed to take care of all these problems. After exchanging 68 for Black 69, White took the important point of 70. Black then quelled the movement of the white stone at 68 with 71, and White played 72 to force

Black 73. White next played 76 as deeply into Black's moyo at the top as he could. Cho's finely honed *shinogi* instinct told him that he could invade that deeply.



Dia. 11


If White had played 1 in Dia. 11 without first exchanging 68 for Black 69, Black would expand his moyo at the top with 2, so invading at 68 first was a high-level move. Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 12 are also possible responses to White 68, but White 4 is a good counter move. However, Black is aiming to invade at 'a', so having peeps at 'b' and 'c' will be helpful. Therefore, it is not desirable to peep at 1. White invaded at 68 with all this in mind.



Dia. 12


The outcome is satisfactory for White. If White played 70 first, the sequence Black 69–White 68–Black 71 might follow. The exchange of White 68 for Black 71 looks bad for White, but this will work in White's favor later on. Therefore, it could be regarded as a forcing move.

Black answered White 72 with 73. It seems as if this is to White's advantage. Instead of 73, another way to answer White 72 would be to surround the territory at the top with 1 and 3 in Dia. 13. But when White continues to expand his left side with 4 and 6, his territory would become too big. If Ryu's confidence in Figure 4 was correct, Black should be satisfied with the result in Dia. 13. But it seems as if he lost this confidence and chose to play 73.




Dia. 13

Black next played the sharp forcing moves of 77 and 79. He then attached at 81. Ryu probably thought that simply surrounding the territory at the top with C or D would not be enough.



Dia. 14

Instead of Black 83, cutting at 1 in Dia. 14 would enable Black to capture a white stone, but in exchange White would reduce Black's territory at the top considerably. Therefore, Black 83 and 85 were the strongest counterattack. White's group could escape with 1, 3, and 5 in Dia. 15, but his group on the right would incur some damage, so this tactic would be used only as a last resort. Cho chose the strongest way: *shinogi* — the technique of securing life for a group under attack.



Dia. 15

Figure 6 (86–100). *Cho at his best*

White 86! Ryu did not consider this move. When he saw it, his face momentarily turned white. The severity of Cho's go is epitomized by his mastery of *shinogi* and his ability to squeeze as much *aji* as possible out of his captured stones.





Figure 6 (86–100)




Dia. 16

White has several moves which enable him to make *sabaki*: the sequence White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c' in Dia. 16, or moves such as White 'd' and White 'e'. Attaching at 86 is a typical Cho move, but he was considering the possibility of all these moves. He played 86 immediately before going into byo-yomi, and it hit Ryu like a bolt of lightning.


The response of Black 87 was full of fighting spirit. If Black answered at 1 in Dia. 17, White would play 2. If Black then peeps at 'a', the marked white stone is on the perfect point to defend if White pushes through at 'b'. Moreover, the white group can make an eye with 'c' as well, so it has more eye shape than it seems. This is the reason why Black now stops attacking the white stones at the top and switches to the upper left side with 87 and 91,

aiming to get compensation by breaking into White's corner territory.




Dia. 17

Ryu regretted playing 93. He said that he should have played 1 in Dia. 18. Black 1 is certainly a vital point, but Cho is the kind of player who might boldly connect at 6. White could then get at least a ko with the sequence from White 'a' to 'e'. With this ko in mind, White might try to disrupt Black's position at the top. At worst, he has the option of playing White 'f', a move mentioned in Dia. 15. Pushing with White 'g', followed by a cut, is another follow-up. Therefore, this variation is not necessarily favorable for Black. Cho has clearly outplayed Ryu in this skirmish.



Dia. 18

Black 99 at 1 in Dia. 19 would be the simplest way to settle this fight. White's territory in the upper left corner becomes Black's. On the other hand, White has broken into Black's territory at the top and has extended to 2, a thick move in the center. But the overall position is unfavorable for Black.



Dia. 19

Figure 7(101–120). *Cho's awesome power*

Cho had been in *byo-yomi* since White 88. Still, he was able to find the strongest moves. Cho's reputation as a player who quickly and accurately reads out variations has recently suffered, but in this game he demonstrated that this ability is still very much alive. Of course, Cho could not read out everything, but he kept coming up with the strongest moves. This is Cho's fearsome power.





Figure 7 (101–120)



Dia. 20

After Black connected at 5, White blocked at 6, aiming at Black's big group. With his marked stone in place, White is challenging Black to a capturing race. If Black wanted to deprive the white group of its eyes, Black 1 in Dia. 20 would be one way to do it. But White would respond with 2 and 4, making the cut

at 'a' and the capture at 'b' *miai*. When White takes the black stone with 'b', the black group does not have two eyes. Black would then find himself in a capturing race, but Ryu must not have been confident that he could win it, so he retreated with 11.

The order of White 14, 16, 18, and 20 was very skillful.

Figure 8 (121–139). *The game is over.*

As you follow the moves in this figure, you can see how marvelous Cho's timing in the center is. Black has no choice but to atari at 21 and push through with 25. But in the meantime, the atari of White 24 becomes the right tesuji. With 26, White captures some black stones and ends in sente. White then plays the moves from 28 to 32, then ataris at 34. The game is now all but over.




Figure 8 (121–139)

When White pushed through with 38, Black did not answer; Ryu was setting the scene for resignation. What kind of white attack is there at the top? Before you turn to the next figure, please think about it. Cho is going to end the game in a brilliant display of power.

There is a great difference between watching Cho play a game and fighting against him on the go board. One can get a feeling of his true power only by playing him. Cho spends an enormous amount of his time thinking about and struggling with apparently ordinary fuseki positions. When he finally enters *byo-yomi*, he chooses a path without hesitation

even though such a path appears to those watching the game to be dangerous. Ryu may have been shocked by the power Cho displays in an important title match.

As I mentioned earlier, Ryu's go is skillful and clever. But Cho's skillfulness and cleverness are second to no one. In order to out-Cho Cho, Ryu needs to surpass Cho in skill and cleverness; he also has to gain more power and severity. Otherwise, it will be impossible for him to defeat Cho.

Figure 9 (140-162). Five more games left

With the sequence from White 40, Cho put an end to Ryu's suffering. White 44 was a forcing move. Without Black 45, White A would kill the black group in the upper left corner. This means that even if Black had connected at 40, White could have reduced Black's territory at the top with White 44 and 50. Cho must have foreseen this result, so he let Black push through in the upper left corner, expecting that the reduction of the black territory at the top would offset the loss of White's territory in the corner.




Figure 9 (140-162)

This is Ryu's first experience in a best-of-seven match. There are still five games left, so perhaps he can still find his pace in the remaining games.


Black resigns after White 162.

(Kido, July 1996. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

An Introduction to Tesuji (vi)


Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan

This series, for novice players, covers all the basic tesujis that you are likely to encounter in your games in easy-to-understand positions. In the fifth instalment we showed you some tesujis which prevent your opponent from linking up his stones. In this issue we are going to give you some examples of tesujis that kill groups. First try solving the three problems given below. Answers and other examples are on the next page.




Problem 1. Black to play

Find the vital point that kills the white stones.



Problem 2. Black to play

It seems that White has two eyes, but if you play the right moves in the right order, you can turn the eye on the left into a false one.




Problem 3. Black to play

By exploiting White's shortage of liberties, Black can prevent White from making two eyes.

An Introduction to Tesuji: Answers

Problem 1. Finding the vital point

When a group of stones has two eyes, it lives. So if you can find the vital point to prevent the group from making eye shape, it dies.




Dia. 1. The vital point

The placement tesuji of Black 1 strikes the vital point of White's eye shape. This is the point where White can make two eyes the easiest. If you can quickly find such points, your ability at killing groups will improve remarkably.

Dia. 2. White dies

After Black 1, there is no way White can live. If White plays 2, Black plays 3 and White can't make eye shape.



Dia. 3. Failure

Black 2 misses the point. When White occupies the vital point of 2, White gets two eyes, one on the 1-1 point and the other on the 2-2 point. If Black 'a' next, White gets two eyes when he plays at 'b'.


Dia. 4. The same

If Black hanes at 1, White again plays on the vital point of 2 and makes two eyes. It would be a mistake for White to atari at 'a'.

Dia. 5. Another example


In this example, there is no question that White has one eye in the corner, but Black has

to prevent him from getting another eye on the left. Where should Black play?



Dia. 6. The diagonal move

The diagonal move of Black 1 is the vital point for depriving White of his second eye. It seems as if this move is a bit laid back, but it is the only move that kills White.




Dia. 7. White dies

White might try to defend against Black 1 with 2, but Black 3 destroys White's chance of getting a second eye. White cannot play at 'a' because he is short of liberties.

Dia. 8. Variation

If White tries playing at 2, Black 3 turns the point at 'a' into a false eye.




Dia. 9. Failure

Black 1 is probably the first move that would occur to most beginning players. However, after White 4, Black can't save the stone at 1 because it is short of liberties.

Problem 2. Creating false eyes

As everyone knows a false eye is the same as no eye at all. However, in a game it is sometimes hard to determine whether an eye is real or false. In this problem, is there a way for Black to turn White's eye on the left into a false one?



Dia. 1


Dia. 2

Dia. 1. The vital point

In this position, the marked black stone is in place. Because of this, throwing in at Black 1 is an effective tesuji to kill the white stones in the corner.

Dia. 2. A false eye

If White takes with 2, Black plays 3 and he can turn the eye at 1 into a false one by playing at either 'a' or 'b'.



Dia. 3

Dia. 4

Dia. 3. A tesuji

Against Black 1, White might connect at 2. In that case, Black 3 is a tesuji. If White captures at 'a', Black connects at 'b' and the eye at 1 is a false one.

Dia. 4. Failure 1


The order of moves is important. If Black plays 1 before 3, White gets two eyes with 2 and 4.

Dia. 5. Failure 2


Black 1 also fails. White ataris at 2 and captures with 4. If Black 'a', White connects at 3 and his group has two eyes.

Dia. 6. Example 1

The tesuji in this example may be hard to see in a game. Pay attention to the marked stone.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 7. A tesuji combination

The tesuji combination of Black 1 and 3 turn the white eye at 1 into a false one. When White ataris at 4, Black links up to his marked stone with 5.




Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia. 8. Failure

Attaching at 1 looks like a tesuji, but White simply connects with 2 and gets two eyes.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

Dia. 9. Example 2


Again, Black aims at creating a false eye. You should learn this technique because you will have many chances to use it.

Dia. 10. Sacrificing two stones

Black 1 is the vital point. If White 2, Black plays 3, sacrificing two stones. After White captures at 4 —



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Dia. 11. A false eye


Black throws in at 1. Of course, White can capture at 'a', but the point 1 is a false eye.

Dia. 12. Only one eye


If White connects at 2, Black plays 3 and White has only one eye.

Problem 3. Shortage of liberties

We have seen how a shortage of liberties is a great aid in putting tesujis into effect. Creating a shortage of liberties in your opponent's position is also useful in killing his stones.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 1. White is short of liberties


It seems as if White will have no trouble making two eyes, but if Black descends to 1, then hanes at 3, White cannot make a second eye at 'a' because he is short of liberties.

Dia. 2. White dies

White has to capture with 1, but then Black plays 2 and White is left with only one eye.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 3. Failure


If Black first plays 1, White will capture with 2. Up to 5, the life of the white stones in the corner depends on a ko, whereas in *Dia. 2* Black captures them unconditionally.

Dia. 4. Another example

The two black stones in the corner are dead, but Black can still utilize them to create a shortage of liberties.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 5. The tesuji

The placement of Black 1 is the tesuji. If White connects at 2, Black plays 3, and White cannot stop Black from linking up at 'a' because he is short of liberties.

Dia. 6. No escaping atari

If White blocks with 2, Black ataris with 3. Even if White connects at 'a', he still finds himself in atari.



Dia. 7

Dia. 7. Failure

The attachment of Black 1 is not a tesuji in this case. Black 3 puts two stones into atari, but White gets two eyes when he plays 4. If Black captures at 'a', White recaptures one stone and his second eye is to the right of 2.

(Let's Go, June 1994. Translated by Richard Bozulich.)

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
Go Proverbs That Are Always True

by Furuyama Kazunari

4. Don't Play Forcing Moves Unnecessarily

In the last article the proverb we studied was 'Don't play atari unnecessarily!' Since some forcing moves are ataris, the concept of this article is related to the last one. Some people tend to play forcing moves without thinking. Or they think that since playing forcing moves ends in sente, they will keep the initiative. Yet, playing forcing moves does not necessarily give profit or the initiative because forcing moves often erase your opponent's bad *aji* or strengthen his shape. I will first show you a common mistake made by amateur players.

Diagram 1 shows a currently fashionable joseki.



Dia. 1


Dia. 2

Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2* are forcing moves. After White 4, Black plays 5 elsewhere. Black 1 and 3 are extremely bad moves. Let's look at Black 1 first. There are three reasons why it is bad.

1. **Black 1 fills a liberty of his five-stone group.** The fewer liberties stones have, the more their movement is constrained. Unless there is a compelling reason to do so, never play a move that will cause your group to lose a liberty.

2. **Black 1 erases a ko threat.** If a ko fight occurs, Black 1 will be a powerful ko threat.

3. **Black 1 wipes out a potential target.** It is possible that Black might play A in *Dia. 3*. This move has a powerful follow-up at B, which threatens the white group in the corner. Should Black exchange Black 1 for White 2 in *Dia. 2*, the threat of Black B disappears.



Dia. 3

Dia. 4


Black 1 in *Dia. 4* is as bad as Black 1 in *Dia. 2*. Again, there are three reasons. Two of them are the same as before.

1. Black 1 erases a ko threat.

2. Black 1 erases the threat at A, followed by B, in *Dia. 3*.

3. **Black 1 provokes White 2, a move which strengthens White's stones.** White will now be able to advance into the center more easily. This last reason needs a thorough explanation.

Black can expand his influence more effectively without the exchange of Black 1 for White 2 in *Dia. 4*. For example, Black can play A in *Dia. 5*, leaving behind a good forcing move at Black B, against which White must retreat to C.




Dia. 5

Dia. 6

If White tries to cut through at 2 and 4 in *Dia. 6*, Black will capture the white stones in the corner with 5, 7, and 9.


For comparison, if Black first pushed at 1, then jumped to 3, White could cut through with 6, 8, and 10 in *Dia. 7* without any danger because the exchange of Black 1 for White 2 has strengthened the white stones.




Dia. 7

4: *tenuki*


Black might even expand his thickness with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8* (after Black 3, White usually plays elsewhere and aims at the cut of White A–Black B–White C).



Dia. 8




Dia. 9




Dia. 10

In response to Black 1, if White tries to cut through with 2 and 4 in *Dia. 9*, Black will destroy White's corner with 7, 9, and 11. However, if Black plays the crude forcing move at 1 in *Dia. 10* and then jumps to 3, White can immediately cut with 4 and 6, since the Black 1–White 2 exchange has strengthened White's position. This result is similar to *Dia. 7*.

Here is another example of how Black 1 in *Dia. 10* strengthens White's position.




Dia. 11



Dia. 12


Black 1 in *Dia. 11*, inducing White to move out into the center, is an effective move to gain some influence at the top. After the sequence to Black 9, White will have a hard time dealing with his shortage of liberties. White can cut at 10, forcing Black to retreat at 11, but this exchange does not resolve the problem of

White's shortage of liberties. If White pincers with 12 in *Dia. 12*, Black can immediately punish White by making thickness with the sequence from 13 to 19. Thickness like this is so overwhelming that White's fighting spirit will die. Moreover, the marked white stone is no longer an effective pincer.




Dia. 13

Instead of 16 in *Dia. 12*, if White tries to counter Black with 16 in *Dia. 13*, after the sequence to Black 23, White is on the verge of collapse.



Dia. 14

Dia. 14 shows the result of *Dia. 13*. Black can connect his stones by capturing a group of two white stones either above or below, so White's group in the center and his stone at the top right all become targets for Black to aim at.



Dia. 15

Preventing this with an atari at A in *Dia. 15* is crude, since Black can extend to B and strengthen his marked stone. White has violated the proverb which says 'Don't play atari unnecessarily!' In addition, this atari does not

resolve White's shortage-of-liberties problem: the cut at Black C, squeezing White, is still effective. Even if White plays the hane of 12, which is better than A, Black just extends to 13, and the problem still remains.

In the first game of the 33rd Judan title match played last year (see *Go World* 73, page 45), Otake (White) blundered and ended up with the position of *Figure 1*. White 42 was his mistake. When Black played 43, White was in trouble. If White forcibly surrounds the three black stones with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 16*, Black 4 and 6 will crush White with the sequence in *Dia. 17*. In the continuation in *Figure 2*, Black gains significant thickness and ends in sente. Otake regretted this result and claimed that he should have followed *Dia. 18*.






Figure 1



Dia. 16



Dia. 17






Figure 2




Dia. 18

When you think about the shortage of liberties, it is clear how bad the forcing move at Black 1 in *Dia. 19* is. After Black 7, White can play a pincer against Black 3 at the top. Unlike *Dia. 13*, cutting through with the sequence Black A–White B–Black C–White D does not create a shortage of liberties, so it does not threaten the white stones in the corner and the cut results in a more disadvantageous position for Black.

Moreover, after this crude forcing exchange of the marked stones in *Dia. 20*, White can easily move into the center with 1. If Black resists by cutting through with the sequence from Black A to White F, he loses only the two stones at C and E. White could also play 1 at A.




Dia. 19




Dia. 20

In contrast, if White plays the knight's move of 1 in *Dia. 21*, Black can easily cut through with 2, 4, and 6. If White tries to fight with A, he will find himself at a disadvantage after the sequence Black B–White C–Black D.

White 1 in *Dia. 22* is the correct move in this position. Black plays the sequence to 8, and White has to defend against the cut at Black A, which forces White to answer at B or C. If White answers A with D, the sequence Black E–White F–Black G kills the white group in the corner. After Black 8, White has two choices: either to fight with H or sacrifice White 7 after playing the forcing move at I. Whichever White plays, the cut at Black A is a severe threat. However, White is not necessarily at a disadvantage; this is an even result.



Dia. 21




Dia. 22


White 1 in *Dia. 23* is also possible in certain positions, even though it seems a bit passive. Its purpose is to make a firm base in preparation for a jump out into the center. In contrast, when Black has played an unnecessary forcing move, as in *Dia. 20*, White doesn't have to be passive; he can march aggressively into the center with 1 or A.

There are cases in which the forcing move of Black 1 in *Dia. 24* might be played. For example, if getting thickness will give Black


an advantage, the combination of Black 1 and 3 might be good. The important thing to remember, though, is that once Black pushes with 1, he must follow it up with 3. Whatever the surrounding position, the outcome will not be as bad as *Dia. 4*. After Black 3, the sequence White A–Black B–White C or the sequence White A–Black B–White D may follow; Black's response depends on the situation.




Dia. 23



Dia. 24




Dia. 25



Dia. 26

Similar examples are shown in *Dia. 25* and *Dia. 26*. In these two josekis, after White crawls and jumps along the side, Black can play elsewhere, but if he pushes at A, Black has no choice but to keep pushing at C after White answers with B.




Dia. 27


In the joseki in *Dia. 27*, I have seen players make a forcing move at Black A, followed by White B, soon after they play 8. This exchange should never be made as it is unnecessary and

only fills a liberty of the three black stones, making it easier for White to invade the left side. This forcing move is bad, just like Black 1 in *Dia. 2*.

Diagram 28 is a good example to help you deepen your understanding of forcing moves.




Dia. 28




Dia. 29

White 1 takes advantage of Black's shortage of liberties to gain thickness. Black's response with 1 in *Dia. 29* may seem to be similar to Black 1 in *Dia. 1*, but this is not the case. Black must play 1 first and then retreat to 3. As a result, Black creates two cutting points, A and B in White's position. If White connects at A, Black will immediately force at C and White must respond with B. The timing of Black C is important: it must be played right after White connects at A. If Black neglects to play it right away, White may answer it differently or he may not answer it at all. For example, if a fight occurs at the top and White gets to play the marked stone in *Dia. 30*, when Black tries to force White to connect at 3 with Black 1, White will respond with 2 instead. If Black then cuts at 3, White will counter with 4 and capture the two black stones. Black A is the strongest resistance, but the sequence White B-Black C-White D leaves Black without a follow-up.



Dia. 30




Dia. 31


You should note that if Black retreats to 1 in *Dia. 31* without pushing through at 2, White

will connect at 2 and his position will have no defects, so Black will not have any beneficial forcing moves. Consequently, the forcing move of Black 1 in *Dia. 29* is necessary, unlike Black 1 in *Dia. 2*.

A note of caution. After White 2, resisting with 3 in *Dia. 32* is not good. It lets White play a severe hane at 4, which gives him more influence in the center. After 12, unless Black has a strong attack against one of these two white groups, the position favors White.




Dia. 32




Dia. 33

Another common forcing-move mistake is shown in *Dia. 33* and *Dia. 34*. After forcing the white stones into a bad shape with Black 2 in *Dia. 33*, this 1-dan player pushed with 4, an unnecessary forcing move. Black should have simply played 6 without the exchange of Black 4 for White 5.




Dia. 34

In *Dia. 34*, a 2-dan player successfully forced the white stones into a bad shape with 2 and 4, but then she made an unnecessary forcing move with 6. Just as in *Dia. 33*, Black has no reason to make this forcing move. Here is an example to demonstrate how bad such a move is.



Dia. 35

In *Dia. 35*, the black group stretching along the right side is insecure, since it is White's turn to play. If White plays the correct tesuji, this group will be in serious trouble. Can you find the tesuji?




Dia. 36


The peep of White 1 in *Dia. 36* is the answer. Even if Black links up to his three stones above, Black cannot easily make another eye around here after White 5. The important point, however, is that White must not play an unnecessary forcing move at A, to which Black would respond with B. This exchange would give this group another eye with the sequence Black C–White D–Black E.

After White 3, if Black blocks at 4 in *Dia. 37*, White can capture the black stones above without giving Black an eye with the sequence to 11. Should Black play 10 at A, White would simply answer at B, and White C and 11 are a

miai. Be careful not to play C in response to Black A. Black D would enable this group either to escape into the center or to make another eye.




Dia. 37



Dia. 38


Now suppose White makes the forcing exchange of the marked stones in *Dia. 38* and starts to attack this group. Unfortunately, White no longer has a tesuji. White 1, which was a vital point in *Dia. 36*, no longer works because of Black 2. Instead of White 1, White A is a nice attack, but with the sequence Black B–White 2–Black 1–White C–Black D–White E–Black F, the black group can easily make another eye.



Dia. 39


The forcing move of the white marked stone in *Dia. 39* is also bad. White 1 is the severest follow-up, but with Black 2 this group is quite resilient. If Black 2 at A, White

would play 2, followed by Black B–White C, capturing the three black stones above.



Dia. 40

Peeping is another kind of forcing move which players often make unnecessarily. For example, when Black pincer at 7 in *Dia. 40*, the 1-dan player who was playing White worried about his stone at 6 and peeped at 10, hoping to strengthen it. However, this was an unnecessary forcing move and it only strengthened the black group. Black was able to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 41*. If White connects at 4, Black already has two eyes when he descends to 5.




Dia. 41


Without this peep, Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 42* will not work. White can separate the black stones with the sequence to 12.

Peeping tends to make an opponent's shape strong, so the timing is important. For example, if Black jumps to 1 in *Dia. 43*, White peeps at 2 to cover the thinness of his own two-space jump. Then, when Black connects at 3, the black shape becomes thick, affecting

White's position on the left, so White will reinforce by jumping to 4. After this, when White has a chance to attack this black group, he might want to peep at A and, after Black B, he would then descend to C, since the white corner would be thin in the shadow of the strengthened black group. These are classic examples of when and how to peep effectively.




Dia. 42




Dia. 43

You can peep only if the peep does not affect your own stones adversely. For example, in *Dia. 44*, White's wall is as thick as concrete, so there is no reason for White to hesitate to peep at 1, 3, and 5 to make the black group heavy and attack with 7. The heavier a group is, the harder it will be for it to escape or make *sabaki*. Otherwise, be careful not to make unnecessary peeps even if they appear to be forcing moves.



Dia. 44




Dia. 6

Dia. 6 (The block from the outside)

If White had blocked from the outside, Black would still have to extend to 2. In this position, it would be easier for Black to invade the corner. Black could not aim at 'a' in this case, so the extension to Black 'b' would not be very attractive in this variation. As you can see, Black's opening strategy depends on how White answers.

Dia. 7 (What happened in the game: 2)

After Dia. 4, White pushed through at 1; up to Black 4 the shape is settled. After this, the sequence Black 'a'–White 'b'–Black 'c' is big. Black 'd' next becomes a big endgame move.




Dia. 7

Dia. 8

Dia. 8 (Satisfactory for Black)

Instead of 1 in Dia. 7, if White had blocked at 1, Black would have responded with 2, then descended to 4 to settle her stones in the corner. In this result, the exchange of the marked black stone for the marked white stone keeps White from closing off the lower side. This means that the white extension at the bottom is not working efficiently.



Dia. 9

Dia. 9 (Comparison)

When you compare Dia. 8 with this dia-

gram, the difference is clear. When Black enters the 3-3 point and slides to 7, White can block at 8 and close off the lower side with 10.




Figure 1 (1-18)

Figure 1 (1-18)

Up to Black 17, the shape was settled. White then played the big fuseki point at 18. Since White had one extra stone at 10, she had more influence toward the center.

Figure 2 (19-34)

White played 26 to take advantage of her thick position below. Black did not answer, but switched to 27. White attached at 34, which has recently become a popular joseki. This move initiated a fierce fight. White eventually resigned. (Moves after 34 omitted.)




Figure 2 (19-34)

(*Shinte Shingata Nenkan* '95. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

The Top Ten Life-and-Death Problems

As selected by 40 professional go players

by Murakami Akira


The top ten life-and-death problems? Selected by professionals? 'Not for me' may be your first thought. 'These are going to be too hard.'

Don't turn the page, though. The criterion is not the difficulty or subtlety of the problems, but their usefulness. The professionals were asked to choose the most instructive problems from among 45 submitted by the staff of *Kido*. These are the problems that the professionals considered best exemplified the basic principles of life-and-death problems.


lems. They are the cream of the crop.

Professionals have always been united in maintaining that studying life-and-death problems is the best way to get stronger. And if you are going to study them, where better to start than with the best?


The problems are given below in order of their popularity (the number of pros choosing each one is given in parentheses). When tackling each problem, it may add to the interest to try to work out why it was chosen.




Problem 1. Black to play and kill White (19 pros)




Problem 2. Black to play and kill White (14)




Problem 3. Black to play and live (12)




Problem 4. Black to play and kill White (12)




Problem 5. Black to play and kill White (11)



Problem 6. Black to play and live (11)



Problem 7. Black to play and kill White (10)



Problem 8. Black to play and kill White (10)


Answers

Answer to Problem 1: The essence


This problem is the runaway winner, with 19 advocates among the 40 professionals polled.

Takemiya Meijin: 'The essence of *tsumego* (life-and-death problems) is packed into this problem. The important thing is not to atari on the third move.'

This position often arises in handicap games, which may account for its popularity.




Correct answer 1




Correct answer 2

Correct answer 1. Black attaches at 1 to restrict White's living space, then pulls back at



Problem 9. Black to play and kill White (9)





Takemiya Meijin's advice: Don't moan and groan, just do it!


Study the simplest life-and-death problems you can find. And don't spend too much time thinking. Look at the answer immediately and do it over again. The important thing is not to moan and groan but to make yourself familiar with the shapes. In other words, develop your intuition rather than your reading.

If you keep this up long enough, you too can become Meijin.


Answer to Problem 2: The vital point

Fourteen pros chose this problem. It's a position that often comes up in actual games. There seem to be two vital points, so the problem is to find the genuine one. Bear in mind that White's outside liberties are all filled in.

Correct answer 1. Black 1 is the real vital point, in accordance with the proverb, 'the 2-1 point is the vital point'. Intercepting at 2 is White's only answer, but Black destroys his eye space with 3 and 5, then hanes at 7, killing White. Instead of 4 —



Correct answer 1




Correct answer 2


Correct answer 2. If White plays at 1 here, Black captures him with 2 and 4. Note that things would be different if White had an outside liberty. In that case, Black would

play 4 at 'a' — we'll leave it up to you to determine what the result will be then.

Failure 1. The easy mistake to make is Black 1. This also looks like a vital point for eye shape, but in this case White can resist with 2. If Black 3, White can challenge Black to a ko.



Failure 1



Failure 2

Failure 2. If Black hanes at 1, White counters with 2. Even though Black threatens his eye shape with 3 and 5, White can again resort to a ko.

Kudo Norio 9-dan's advice: Try easy problems.


Don't bother about difficult problems: try problems that you can handle. I'm fond of shogi, but I only do shogi problems up to 9-kyu level.

Answer to Problem 3: Efficacy of the hane


This shape looks as if White can make it *gomoku-nakade* (a five-point space that becomes only one eye), but Black's hane on the edge is very useful in securing life.

This problem was probably chosen by so many professionals (12) because of the simplicity of the shape.

Correct answer 1. Black 1, turning inward on the side with the hane, is a good move. When White tries to steal his eye shape with 2, Black calmly secures one eye with 3. If 4, Black blocks at 5, and White can't connect at 'a'. The hane works very effectively.



Correct answer 1




Correct answer 2

Correct answer 2. If White tries to reduce Black to one large eye with the *nakade* move of 2, Black expands his eye space by connecting at 3. If White 4, Black intercepts with 5

and lives: White 'a' does not create a *nakade*.

Failure 1. Black 1 is on the wrong side: it doesn't make use of his own hane. White now kills Black with the hane of 2. Next, if Black 'a', White 'b'; if instead Black 'c', White 'd'. There's not enough room to live.



Failure 1

Failure 2

Failure 2. If Black 1, White throws in at 2 and can now create a *gomoku-nakade* shape. Next, if Black 'a', White 'b'; if instead Black 'c', White 'd' makes a *sanmoku-nakade* (three-point single eye)

Haruyama Isamu 9-dan: A classic
The single hane works exquisitely. This is a classic problem that contains the essence of *tsume-go*.


Answer to Problem 4: Playing patiently

This problem earned the same number of votes as Problem 3, but the latter placed third because of the more enthusiastic praise expressed by the players who voted for it.

When tackling life-and-death problems, the tendency is to look for flashy moves, but ironically this problem requires the opposite approach.

The first move decides everything.

Correct answer 1. Killing White is surprisingly easy: the ordinary diagonal move of 1 does the job. If White 2, he can't get enough space to live after Black 3. Black 1 could be a blind spot for players who take life-and-death problems too seriously.




Correct answer 1

Correct answer 2

Correct answer 2. Forcing with White 1

doesn't help. If next White 'a', Black 'b'; if instead White 'c', Black 'd'—White 'a'—Black 'b'.

Failure 1. The natural temptation is to attach at 1, as this is so often a tesuji. However, that makes White 2 sente, giving White time to live with 4.



Failure 1

Failure 2

Failure 2. Black 1 also looks stylish; if White 2, Black attaches at 3. However, Black runs out of moves after White 4; if Black 5, White 6 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.

Izumitani Masanori 7-dan: An unforgettable problem

This shape came up in a lesson I received at a go club as a child and I was scolded for attaching [Black 1 at 2 in *Correct answer 1*]. That made this problem one I'll never forget.


Answer to Problem 5: A light touch

The question is whether to slide into White's eye space with a small-knight or large-knight move. The follow-up to both looks difficult, but you'll find things are simpler after the small-knight move.


This problem was probably chosen because it often appears in actual games and because it's a 'clean' (that is, uncluttered) shape

Correct answer 1. The restrained move of 1 is the more powerful of the two obvious candidates. If White 2, Black calmly pulls back at 3. White 4 is the only move — what happens now?

The position after 4 would also make an excellent life-and-death problem. If Black 'a', White gets a ko with 'b'; if instead Black 'c', White attaches at 'a' and lives.




Correct answer 1




Correct answer 2

Correct answer 2. Black makes a direct attack on White's eye shape with 1. If White 2, Black 3 and 5 make a *sanmoku-nakade* (a three-point single eye). This works because White can't play in at 'a'.

Failure 1. Starting with the hane of 1 here (instead of the placement at 3) is a mistake. Now when Black plays 3, White lives with 4.



Failure 1



Failure 2

Failure 2. The large-knight move of 1 is wrong. White counters with 2 to 6. If Black connects at 4, White lives with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'. That means that Black has to fight a ko by extending to 'a' after White 6.

Shirae Haruhiko 7-dan: A stylish problem.


This is a problem that could easily come up in actual play. One naturally first thinks of the large knight, but the lethal move is the small knight. That's what makes this a stylish problem.

Answer to Problem 6: Surprising shape


Not only does Black seem to lack sufficient eye space, his four stones on the left are short of liberties: he seems to have little chance of saving himself. However, there is one move — and one move only — that will secure two eyes.

Correct answer 1. Black 1 is the only move that secures two eyes. If White 2, descending at 3 is important. If White 4, Black 5 makes miai of 'a' and 'b', guaranteeing a seki. In connection with this problem, Watanabe Reiji 5-dan made the comment: 'I always tell my pupils that making a jagged shape is the

best way to live.'




Correct answer 1




Correct answer 2

Correct answer 2. If White counters 1 by cutting with 2 and 4, Black simply descends at 5. If he carelessly played 5 at 'a', the hane of White 5 would kill him.

Failure 1. Trying to expand his eye space with 1 backfires when White attaches at 2. Black 3 and 5 are useless, as White creates a *gomoku-nakade*. If Black plays 3 at 'a', White 4 kills him.



Failure 1



Failure 2

Failure 2. If Black 1, White exploits his shortage of liberties with 2 to 6.

Ishida Yoshio 9-dan: A practical problem.


The best way to get strong at *tsume-go* is to tackle repeatedly the problems that often come up in actual play. If you can master the practical problems like the present one, you will qualify as a strong amateur player.

Answer to Problem 7: Inspiration


This is the most difficult of the problems in this collection. However, it's a beautiful problem, with some impressive moves.

The point is to aim at a *gomoku-nakade*, but you have to be careful not to get a seki. The villain complicating matters is White's hane.

Correct answer 1. Black has to start with the placement at 1. If White 2, Black plays 3, and killing White is quite simple. If White 'a', Black 'b'; if White 'b', Black 'a' creates a *gomoku-nakade*.




Correct answer 1




Correct answer 2

Correct answer 2. If White descends at 2, Black counters by jumping to 3: this move is the highlight of this problem. Next, 'a' and 'b' are miai, so White is dead. Black 3 is an inspired move. Instead —

Failure 1. If Black hastily cuts at 1, White counters with 2 and lives: after White 4, Black can't connect at 'a' — note the efficacy of the marked white stone.



Failure 1




Failure 2

Failure 2. If Black starts with 1, White descends at 2. If Black 3, White 4 leads to the same result as in the previous diagram. If Black plays 3 at 4, White 3 creates a seki.


O Rissei Oza: Painstaking analysis
I couldn't solve this problem at first sight. When that happens to me, I painstakingly analyse each possibility, move by move. If you do that, you'll find the answer in the end.

Answer to Problem 8: Tesuji

After you've mastered the basic way of thinking of life-and-death, the next step is to master, one by one, new techniques. The present problem is a good example. If you don't know the technique involved here, you may not guess it no matter how long you think.



Correct answer 1




Correct answer 2

Dia. 1. The solution is to jump down to the edge with Black 1. If White 2, Black jumps in at 3, robbing White of eye shape at 'a'. The beauty of playing on the first line is that 1 and 3 are securely connected.


Correct answer 2. If White descends at 2, Black again jumps in at 3, stopping him from getting enough room for eye space. If White 4, Black 5.

Failure 1. The 'ordinary' idea would be to descend at 1, but now White 2 succeeds in creating two eyes. There is no way Black can stop the point of 'a' from becoming an eye — if Black 'b', White captures it with 'c'. You can now see how effective jumping down to the edge was.

Failure 2. The hane of Black 1 looks strong, but when White resists with 2 and 4, Black won't be able to kill him unconditionally. If Black gives way in the ko fight and connects at 'a', White plays 'b' and can still fight a ko for life. Black 5 at 'c' would start the ko immediately: White 6.



Failure 1



Failure 2



Kato Masao 9-dan: Where's the vital point?

When tackling life-and-death problems, the first thing you have to think about is where is the vital point. If you familiarize yourself with the vital points of as many shapes as possible, you will be able to apply this knowledge in your own games.


Answer to Problem 9: The basics

This problem follows the basic principle of life-and-death: reduce the opponent's eye space, then play at the vital point.


Actually there are two solutions to this problem, but that makes it no less instructive.

Correct answer 1. The hane of 1 is obvious. Black further reduces White's eye space with 3, then makes the placement at the vital point of 5. These two moves are a combination faithful to the principle mentioned above. If White tries to make two eyes with 6, Black is able to destroy the second eye with 7 and 9. This is another important technique in life-and-death problems. Even if White plays 6 at 8 or at 'a', Black still connects at 7.

Correct answer 2. Black can also kill White by making a placement at 3 immediately. If White 4, Black plays 5 and 7. However, the previous sequence is more faithful to the basics and more efficient.



Correct answer 1




Correct answer 2

Failure 1. Attacking White's eye shape prematurely with 3 is a crude move. This lets White live with 4 and 6.




Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan: Start with the basics

My advice is to start by mastering the basic problems. You don't have to worry about the carpenter's square — I don't understand it either.



Failure 1



Failure 2


Failure 2. The attachment at 2 is another crude move. White lives with 4 and 6. Note that if White plays 2 at 'a', Black kills him simply by crawling at 'b'.

Answer to Problem 10: The question of a liberty


Players who have mastered the basics will solve this problem at a glance, but for others it's easy to play a crude move and help White live.

The important thing is not to confuse this shape with the one in which White has an extra liberty open (at the marked stone) — that leads to a different result. The problem with the liberty open is a more difficult one, suitably for high-dan players.

Correct answer 1. The two hanes of 1 and 3 kill White. This problem is a model illustration of the proverb, 'death lies in the hane'. Anyone with an elementary knowledge of life-and-death problems knows that White doesn't have enough space to live after 3; if you don't, you should spend some time with a life-and-death primer.



Correct answer 1




Correct answer 2

Correct answer 2. You have to know how to kill White if he answers at 2. Once again, a simple hane does the trick. If White tries to

confuse Black with 4, Black 5 will finish him off.

Failure 1. Pushing down at 1 is a crude move. The result after 3 is to help White make eye shape. The best Black can do now is to capture three stones after 10. If Black plays 7 at 10, White lives with 'a'.



Failure 1

Failure 2

Failure 2. Black 1 is even cruder. It's easy for White to live.

Abe Yoshiteru 9-dan: A common shape


This is a common shape, resulting from a 3-3 invasion under a star-point stone. The outside liberties make a big difference, and it's easy for amateurs who have half-memorized the pattern to get confused. The way White answers makes a difference too.

This problem is a good example of killing with a hane.

As you can see from the above ten problems, professionals have a tendency to select practical problems that exemplify basic principles they think amateurs should master and that often come up in actual play. One consistent piece of advice was that amateurs should familiarize themselves with the vital points of the basic shapes rather than agonizing over difficult problems.

That may make it a bit easier to follow the advice pros always give to people who want to get stronger at go: study life-and-death problems.

Needless to say, there were many excellent problems that didn't make the top ten. In the space that we have left, we would like to present four of them.




1. Black to play

2. Black to play

1. Can you find the vital point for eye shape?

2. This is a common corner shape, with many complications.



3. Black to play

4. Black to play

3. The answer may be a blind spot.

4. The first move is a strange-looking one — but it works!


Answers on page 64.

Komatsu Hideki 9-dan: Repetition

Tackle a lot of simple problems. Even high-dan amateur players should repeatedly solve a lot of shodan-level problems. When I do shogi problems, I only do three-move problems.




Answers to page 63 problems




Answer to Problem 1

Black 1 is the vital point: it guarantees eyes at 'a' and 'b'.




Answer to Problem 2

Dipping down at 1 is the key. If White 2, Black makes two eyes with 3. If Black is greedy and plays 1 at 2, White kills him with White 1, Black 'a', White 'b'.



Answer to Problem 3

Connecting at the root of Black's shape with 1 is the answer. If next White 'a', Black can hane at 'b'.



Answer to Problem 4

Black sacrifices a stone with 1, then plays in at 1 after White 2 — that makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.

(Kido, January 1996. Translated by John Power.)

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- 40th Oza: Kobayashi Koichi v. Fujisawa Shuko
- 18th Tengen: Rin Kaiho v. Yamashiro
- 3rd Tong Yang Securities Cup: Rin Kaiho v. Lee Chang-ho

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Compiled, edited, and translated by John Power

Finally, this long out-of-print book on one of the greatest go players who ever lived has been reprinted. Shusaku was the leading player of the golden age of go in the mid-19th century. He has become known to later generations as the Saint of Go (*kisei*) and is recognized by modern players as one of the great geniuses in the history of the game. His victories over his contemporaries in a number of matches contributed to his reputation, but its main foundation is his perfect record, not even approached by any other player, of nineteen successive wins in the annual castle games played in the presence of the shogun.

Shusaku's games are considered the best model for aspiring professional players to study, especially his games with black. He was unexcelled in his complete mastery of the strategic principles and the practical techniques of go. His games are a treasure house of all the varied elements of the game, from the fuseki to the endgame, but in particular they provide amateur players with ideal material for studying the art of fighting in the middle game.

Here are some 20th century views of Shusaku:

'Shusaku simplified the complexity of go, concealing his great strength and profound analysis beneath the smooth surface of his game . . . It is not an exaggeration to say that all the principles and all the techniques of go are embodied in concentrated form in Shusaku's go.' — Segoe Kensaku 9-dan

'The speed and forcefulness of Shusaku's play with black are like lightning striking the go board; his skill at finishing off his opponent once he took the lead is unrivalled.' — Hayashi Yutaka, go historian

'Shusaku would read out all the possible variations, then play straightforwardly, making the simplest move, if he thought it ensured a win. This way of playing is only possible if one has a clear understanding of the principles of go and is blessed with superb positional judgement, and it also requires considerable self-confidence. On those rare occasions when he got into a bad position, he would display tremendous strength in fighting his way back into the lead. The castle game with Ito Showa in 1850 is a good example of a game in which he reveals his latent strength . . . Another feature of his go is his flexibility and willingness to experiment. Modern go is still far from surpassing Shusaku.' — Ishida Yoshio, former Meijin, Honinbo

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